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INTRODUCTION
Under the British North America Act of 1867,1
which united the various British Colonies in
North America in a federal union, legislative
power was divided between the central authority,
the Parliament of Canada, and the legislatures of
the component provinces. The residual legislative
authority to make laws "for the peace order and
good government of Canada" is vested in Parlia-
ment but, in addition, the B.N.A. Act grants
exclusive legislative jurisdiction to Parliament to
legislate in relation to matters coming within
certain enumerated classes of subjects. By section
91, clause 27, the Parliament of Canada is given
exclusive legislative jurisdiction in relation to the
"Criminal Law, except the constitution of the
courts of criminal jurisdiction, but including the
procedure in criminal matters." By section 92 of
the B.N.A. Act, each of the provinces is given
legislative jurisdiction in relation to matters
coming within a number of specified classes of
subjects including "(13) Property and Civil Rights
in the Province" and "(16) Generally all matters
of a merely local or private nature." Among the
enumerated classes of subjects assigned to the
provincial legislature is "(15) The imposition of
punishment by fine, penalty, or imprisonment for
enforcing any law of the province made in relation
to any matter coming within any of the classes of
subjects enumerated in this section."
In Proprietary Articles Trade Association v.
A. G. Can. Lord Atkin, speaking for the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, in discussing
the power of Parliament to create new crimes
said:--
"In their Lordships' opinion s.498 of the
Criminal Code and the greater part of the
130 & 31 VicT., c.3 (U.K.).
2 [1931) A.C. 310, 323-4.
provisions of the Combines Investigation Act
fall within the power of the Dominion Parlia-
ment to legislate as to matters falling within the
class of subjects, 'the criminal law including the
procedure in criminal matters' (s.91, head 27).
The substance of the Act is by s.2 to define, and
by s.32 to make criminal, combines which the
legislature in the public interest intends to
prohibit. The definition is wide, and may cover
activities which have not hitherto been consid-
ered to be criminal. But only those combines
are affected 'which have operated or are likely
to operate to the detriment or against the
interest of the public, whether consumers,
producters or others'; and if Parliament gen-
uinely determines that commercial activities
which can be so described are to be suppressed
in the public interest, their Lordships see no
reason why Parliament should not make them
crimes. 'Criminal law' means 'the criminal law
in its widest sense': Attorney-General for Ontario
v. Hamilton Street Ry. Co., [1930] A.C. 524. It
certainly is not confined to what was criminal
by the law of England or of any Province in
1867. The power must extend to legislation to
make new crimes. Criminal law connotes only
the quality of such acts or omissions as are
prohibited under appropriate penal provisions
by authority of the State. The Criminal quality
of an act cannot be discerned by intuition; nor
can it be discovered by reference to an), standard
but one: Is the act prohibited with penal conse-
quences? Morality and criminality are far from
co-extensive; nor is the sphere of criminality
necessarily part of a more extensive field covered
by morality-unless the moral code necessarily
disapproves all acts prohibited by the State, in
which case the argument moves in a circle.
It appears to their Lordships to be of little
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value to seek to confine crimes to a category of
acts which by their very nature belong to the
domain of 'criminal jurisprudence'; for the
domain of criminal jurisprudence can only be
ascertained by examining what acts at any
particular period are declared by the State to
be crimes, and the only common nature they
will be found to possess is that they are pro-
hibited by the State and that those who commit
them are punished."
On the other hand, the provinces have the
legislative jurisdiction by virtue of section 92(15)
to affix penalties to their own competently enacted
legislation in order to enforce it. The power of
the provinces to impose penalties to enforce their
legislation with respect to matters committed to
them has resulted in the development of a body
of law which is sometimes called "Provincial
Criminal Law. ' 3 In R. v. Yolles, 4 Porter, C.J.O.,
said:
"It is, however, one of the powers exclusive to
the Province, to impose penalties for the enforce-
ment of its own statutes. Such penal statutes of
the Province have been variously designated as
'provincial criminal law,' 'quasi-crimes' or
offences of a civil nature. They undoubtedly
have the essential characteristic of criminal
law in that they are penal."
Where the constitutional validity of such enact-
ments is brought into question the courts must
examine the legislation to ascertain its true
purpose. The provinces cannot under the guise of
inflicting a penalty for the violation of an enact-
ment of a regulatory nature prohibit conduct as
contra bonos mores and thereby encroach upon the
exclusive jurisdiction of Parliament to create
crimes.1
The courts will examine "the pith and sub-
stance" of the legislation no matter what form it
may take. There may be an area in which the
jurisdiction of Parliament and that of the provinces
may overlap, that is to say, a province may validly
legislate in relation to a matter in its provincial
aspect notwithstanding that Parliament might
properly legislate in relation to the same matter
from a federal aspect. In this situation the pro-
vincial legislation remains valid unless and until
it is superseded by federal legislation in pari
materia. If the Provincial and Dominion enact-
3 Re McNutt, 47 S.C.R. 259, 21 Can. C.C. 157
(1912); Saumur v. Recorder's Court, [1947] S.C.R. 492,
494.
4123 Can. C.C. 305, 318 (1959).
' R. v. Hayduk, [19381 O.R. 653, 71 Can. C.C. 134.
ments come into conflict the Provincial legislation
is superseded or abrogated to the extent that it
conflicts with the Dominion legislation.6
An excellent illustration of the division of
legislative jurisdiction between the Dominion and
the Provinces is afforded by the judgment of the
Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Yolles. The
regulation of Highway Traffic is within the legisla-
tive jurisdiction of the provinces.
Section 29(1) of the Ontario Highway Traffic
Act,1 provides that:
"Every person is guilty of the offence of driving
carelessly who drives a motor vehicle on a
highway without due care and attention or
without reasonable consideration for other
persons using the highway."
The Dominion Criminal CodeP by section 221(1)
provides that everyone who is criminally negligent
in the operation of a motor vehicle is guilty of an
indictable offence.
The definition of criminal negligence contained
in section 191 of the Criminal Code requires the
shoiving of a wanton or reckless disregard for the
lives or safety of other persons.10
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that section
29(1) was valid provincial legislation in relation to
the control of traffic on highways in the province
and that it was not "in pith and substance"
legislation in relation to criminal law. Moreover,
there was no conflict between the provincial
legislation and section 221 of the Criminal Code
which made the criminally negligent operation of
a motor vehicle a crime since by definition criminal
negligence requires "recklessness," a different
mental attitude to the one required to constitute
the offence of driving carelessly.
6 "There can be a domain in which provincial legis-
lation may overlap in which case neither legislation
will be ultra vires if the field is clear, but if the field is
not clear and the two legislations meet the Dominion
legislation must prevail: see G.T.R. v. A.G. Can., [1907]
A.C. 65." Lord Tomlin in A.G. Can. v. A.G. B. C.,
[1930] A.C. 111, 118.
7Provincial Secretary of P.E.I. v. Egan, [1941]
S.C.R. 396, 76 Can. C.C. 227.
8 R.S.O., c. 167 (1950), as reenacted by 1955 (ONT.)
c.29, §4.
9 1953-54 (CAN.) c.51.
i "191(1) Every one is criminally negligent who (a) in
doing anything, or (b) in omitting to do anything that
it is his duty to do shows wanton or reckless disgregard
for the lives or safety of other persons."
11 Cf., Re Dodd, [1957] O.R. 5, 116 Can. C.C. 337,
where the same court held that §48(1) of the Ontario
Highway Traffic Act was in conflict with §285(2) (now
§221(3)) which creates the offense of leaving the scene
of an accident with intent to escape liability, civil or
criminal, and hence was superseded thereby.
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This brief description of the provincial power to
create "offences" and the power of parliament to
create "crimes" is of necessity fragmentary but
some description of the Canadian federal system
is necessary in order to understand, in the discus-
sion which follows, the enactments with respect to
the abolition of the privilege against self incrimina-
tion in its federal and provincial aspects.
SELF-INCRIMINATION IN CANADA
It is necessary to distinguish between the
position of an accused person at his trial on a
criminal charge and the position of a mere witness.
The accused at his trial on a criminal charge is not
a compellable witness, and no questions can be
put to him by the court or the prosecutor unless
he chooses to become a witness in his own behalf.
12
Section 4 the Canada Evidence Act 3 provides as
follows:
"(1) every person charged with an offence and,
except as in this section otherwise provided,
the wife or husband, as the case may be of the
person so charged, is a competent witness for
the defence, whether the person so charged is
charged solely or jointly with any other person."
"(5) the failure of the person charged, or of the
wife or husband of such person, to testify, shall
not be made the subject of comment by the
judge, or by the counsel for the prosecution."
Where the accused does testify on his own
behalf he may of course by cross-examination be
required to incriminate himself in respect of the
offence charged, and since he puts himself forward
as a credible person he may therefore be ques-
tioned as to whether he has been previously
convicted.14 He may not, however, be cross-exam-
ined as to previous misconduct which has not led
to conviction unless such acts are relevant to the
charge against him, as they may be if they are
relevant to the issue of identity or to negative
accident or innocent intent.15
Parliament has, however, with respect to offences
created under federal statutes, occasionally made
12 "Such person is not a compellable witness and
therefore cannot be directly called upon to testify by or
on behalf of the Crown." Osler, J.A., in R. v. D'Aoust,
5 Can. C.C. 407, 3 O.L.R. 653 (1902). 8 WrGmoRE,
EViDENCE §2268(2) (3d ed. 1940).
13 R.S.C., c.307 (1952).
"Id., §12; R. v. D'Aoust, supra note 12; R. v. Dor-
land, [1948] O.R. 913, 92 Can. C.C. 274, leawe to app.
ref d, 93 Can. C.C. 135.
Is Koufis v. The King, [1941] S.C.R. 481, 76 Can.
C.C. 161.
the accused a compellable witness at the instance
of the prosecution. 6 Moreover, in respect of
prosecutions for provincial offences in Ontario,
the accused is a compellable witness for the
prosecution. The Ontario Evidence Act by Section
1(a) defines "action" as including "a prosecution
for an offence committed against a statute of
Ontario or against a by-law or regulation made
under any such statute" and section 5 provides:
"The parties to an action, and the persons on
whose behalf the same is brought, instituted,
opposed or defended shall, except as hereinafter
otherwise provided, be competent and compel-
lable to given evidence on behalf of themselves
or of any of the parties and the husbands and
wives of such parties and persons shall except
as hereinafter otherwise provided, be competent
and compellable to give evidence on behalf of
any of the parties.'
7
The common law privilege protecting a witness
from answering questions which may tend to
incriminate him has been abolished in respect of
proceedings over which the Parliament of Canada
has legislative jurisdiction by the Canada Evidence
Act subject to the protection afforded by section
5 thereof whereby if the witness objects to answer-
ing the answer cannot be used in subsequent
proceedings. Section 5 reads as follows:
"(1) No witness shall be excused from answering
any question upon the ground that the answer
to such question may tend to criminate him, or
may tend to establish his liability to a civil
proceeding at the instance of the Crown or of
any person.
(2) Where with respect to any question a
witness objects to answer upon the ground that
his answer may tend to criminate him, or may
tend to establish his liability to a civil proceeding
at the instance of the Crown or of any person,
and if but for this Act, or the Act of any pro-
vincial legislature, the witness would therefore
have been excused from answering such question,
then although the witness is by reason of this
Act, or by reason of such provincial Act, com-
pelled to answer, the answer so given shall not
be used or receivable in evidence against him in
1" See, for example, R. V. Fee, 13 O.R. 590 (1887),
where under a provision in the Canada Temperance
Act the accused was compelled to testify at the instance
of the prosecution. See also R. v. Pantelidis, 79 Can.
C.C. 46 (1942).
'7 The Ontario Evidence Act, R.S.O., c.119 (1950).




any criminal trial, or other criminal proceeding
against him thereafter taking place, other than
a prosecution for perjury in the giving of such
evidence."
A similar provision exists in the Ontario Evidence
Act dealing with matters over which the Province
has legislative jurisdiction. Section 7 provides as
follows:
"(1)A witness shall not be excused from answer-
ing any question upon the ground that the
answer may tend to criminate him, or may
tend to establish his liability to a civil proceed-
ing at the instance of the Crown or of any person
or to a prosecution under any Act of the Legis-
lature.
(2) If, with respect to any question, a witness
objects to answer upon any of the grounds
mentioned in subsection 1, and if, but for this
section or any Act of the Parliament of Canada,
he would therefore have been excused from
answering such question, then, although the
witness is by reason of this section or by reason
of any Act of the Parliament of Canada com-
pelled to answer, the answer so given shall not
be used or receivable in evidence against him in
any civil proceeding or in any proceeding under
any Act of the Legislature." 8
The other provincial legislatures have enacted
similar statutes; 9 however, the common law
privilege of refusing to answer questions which
may tend to criminate the witness seems to have
been retained in Newfoundland and Prince Edward
Island with respect to proceedings over which the
provinces have jurisdiction.20
It is quite clear from the terms of the Canada
Evidence Act that a witness who is compelled to
answer questions in a provincial proceeding by
virtue of a provincial enactment is protected in
18 It will be noted that the Canada Evidence Act pro-
vides that if the witness objects to answer his answer
shall not be receivable in evidence against him in any
proceeding thereafter taking place. The Ontario Evi-
dence Act merely states that the answer if objected to
shall not be receivable in evidence against him in any
proceeding. It might therefore be arguable that al-
though an accused is a compellable witness for the
prosecution in a provincial prosecution nevertheless if
he objected to answer on the ground that his answer
would tend to criminate him that answer is protected
and is not receivable in evidence against him in the very
proceeding before the court.
19 R.S. NOVA SCOTLA, c.88, §55 (1954); R.S. NEw
BRuNswicK, c.74, §7 (1952); R.S. MANITOBA, c.75, §7(1954); R.S. ALBERTA, c.102, §8 (1955); R.S. BRiTisn
CoLuMmIA, c.113, §5 (1948).
20 R.S. NEWFrOUNDLAND, c.120, §3 (1952); R.S.
PaiNcE EDwARD ISLAND, c.52, §6 (1951).
respect of his answers in relation to a subsequent
criminal prosecution for a crime under a federal
statute.21 Under the Ontario Evidence Act the
witness who is compelled to answer in a proceeding
over which the province has jurisdiction is pro-
tected in respect of his answer in relation to a
subsequent prosecution for the violation of a
provincial enactment. Similarly, by virtue of the
Act, if in any proceeding over which the Parlia-
ment of Canada has jurisdiction the witness is
compelled to answer over his objection, the witness
is protected in respect of that answer in relation
to a subsequent prosecution for a violation of a
provincial enactment. The witness is thus pro-
tected in respect of his answer whether the answer
is made in a proceeding over which Parliament
has jurisdiction or whether the proceeding is one
over which the province has jurisdiction, and he is
protected against its use both in respect of a
subsequent prosecution for the violation of a
provincial enactment or a federal statute.
It is quite clear that the witness is protected in
respect of the subsequent use of his answers only
if he objects, and the court or other tribunal is
not required to advise the witness of his rights.
In R. v. TassD Kerwin, J., (now C.J.C.) said: "[Tihe
matter seems quite clear that if the person testi-
fying does not claim the exemption, the evidence
so given may be later used against him, and this
notwithstanding the fact that he may not know
of his rights." Moreover, the Canada Evidence
Act applies to all proceedings where a witness may
be lawfully examined under oath and is not
restricted to judicial proceedings. In R. v. Mazeral1n
the accused was charged with the offence of
conspiring to violate the Official Secrets Act, and
evidence was admitted of answers given by the
accused in reply to questions put to him before
a Royal Commission consisting of the Honourable
Mr.. Justice Kellock and the Honourable Mr.
Justice Taschereau constituted by an Order in
Council under the provisions of the Inquiries Act24
with power to require witnesses to given evidence
under oath. Prior to being examined before the
Royal Commission, Mazerall had been taken into
custody by an officer of the Royal Canadian
21 R. v. Harcourt, 53 Can. C.C. 156 (1929); R. v.
Simpson & Simmons, 79 Can. C.C. 344 (1943), leave
to app. to Sup. Ct. of Can. ref'd, 80 Can. C.C. 78. Afortiori if the answer is compelled under a federal
statute.
22 87 Can. C.C. 97, 99 (1946).
23 86 Can. C.C. 137, id. 321 (C.A.) (1946).
24 R.S.C., c.99 (1927).
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Mounted Police and was detained in custody in
the police barracks in Ottawa under the authority
of an Order in Council purporting to be made
under powers conferred upon the Governor General
in Council by the War Measures Act.25 The Order
in Council empowered the Minister of Justice, if
satisfied that, with a view to preventing any
particular person from communicating secret
and confidential information to an agent of a
foreign power or otherwise acting in a manner
prejudicial to public safety, it was necessary so to
do to make an order that such person be inter-
rogated and detained. While still in custody under
the order the accused was brought before the
Royal Commission and was examined on oath.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeal held
that the accused's answers under oath given
without objection before the Royal Commission
were admissible on his trial for conspiracy. The
court clearly recognized the distinction between
the so called confession rule and the privilege of a
witness against self-incrimination. With respect to
evidence given under oath by a witness it was not
necessary for the prosecution to establish that the
answers were freely and voluntarily made, nor
would their admissibility be affected, as would
statements made to the police by inducements or
threats held out or exercised by the police while in
their custody.
It is quite clear that documents which are
produced under the compulsion of a statute are
not protected by section 5 of The Canada Evidence
Act even though their production is objected to.u
But while the documents are not protected against
use by the prosecution in a subsequent criminal
proceeding against the witness, they must be
proved independently of the evidence of the witness
as to which objection was taken.Y
2 R.S.C., c.206 (1927).21 R. v. Simpson & Simmons, 79 Can. C.C. 344
(B.C.C.A.) (1943), leave to app. to the Sup. Cf. of Can.
ref'd, 80 Can. C.C. 78. ("That section is limited by its
express terms to an answer by a witness to a question
and says nothing whatever about the use of incriminat-
ing documents produced by a witness under compulsion
and after objection. This section therefore can have no
application to the facts of this case and could not and
cannot be invoked by Simpson to protect him from the
use of those documents against him at his trial." Sloan,
J.A., 79 Can. C.C. 344, 353.)
27 "1 am satisfied with the admissibility of the books
and documents in question at the trial but yet another
aspect of the matter remains to be dealt with i.e. the
method of proof of these documents. No difficulty is
found on this score with relation to the books of account
of James Maynard Ltd. They were admittedly proved
Under both Dominion and Provincial legislation
there are many statutes which create administra-
tive tribunals with all the powers of a court to
summon witnesses and to require them to give
evidence under oath with respect to the matter
under investigation.n These investigations are
frequently followed by prosecutions for serious
crimes such as conspiracy to defraud, arson, theft
of securities, combinations in restraint of trade
and other offences. The abolition of the privilege
of a witness to refuse to answer criminating ques-
tions enables these tribunals to subject a person
suspected of illegal acts to a most searching
examination which often enables a case to be built
up against him. In R. v. Barnesn the accused after
his committal for trial on a charge of manslaughter
was served with a subpoena requiring him to give
evidence before the coroner.30 The Ontario Court
a/iunde by the evidence of the witness 'Worsley."
Sloan, J.A., in R. v. Simpson & Simmons, 79 Can. C.C.
344, 357 (1943).
28 Some examples of this type of legislation may be
found in the following statutes: The Ontario Securities
Act, R.S.O., c.351, §§21, 23 (1950); this statute author-
izes the appointment of a person or persons to make in-
vestigation into the affairs of companies trading in
securities and other matters. The Fire Marshal's Act,
R.S.O., c.140 (1950), authorizes the Fire Marshal to
conduct an investigation into the cause, origin or cir-
cumstances of any fire for the purpose to determining
whether it was the result of carelessness or design and
to report to the Crown Attorney the result of his findings
and for this purpose he has the right to summon wit-
nesses to give evidence under oath. The Combines In-
vestigation Act, R.S.C., c.314 (1952), authorizes the
Director of Investigation or a member of the Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission appointed under the Act
to order that any person present in Canada be examined
on oath where a breach of the Act is suspected. The
Excise Act, R.S.C., c.99 (1952), empowers certain
officers to conduct inquiries into matters relating to the
excise and to summon witnesses and require them to give
evidence under oath. R. v. Denmark, 72 Can. C.C. 9
(1939).
2136 Can. C.C. 40 (1921).
30 The Corners Act, R.S.O., c.70, §18(1) (1950), pro-
vides that -where a person has been charged with a
criminal offence arising out of a death, an inquest
touching the death shall be held only upon the direction
of the Attorney-General. Undei §25(1) the Coroner has
the same power to summon witnesses and to punish for
refusing to give evidence as a court. Section 25(4) pro-
vides that a witness shall be deemed to have objected to
answer any question upon the ground that his answer
may tend to criminate him and the answer so given
shall not be used or be receivable in evidence against
him in any trial or other proceeding against him there-
after taking place other than a prosecution for perjury.
The effect of §25(4) is of doubtful validity in so far as it
purports to affect the admissibility of answers in subse-
quent criminal proceedings. Section 5 of The Canada
Evidence Act applies thereto, and that Act requires the
witness to take objection. R. v. Mottola & Vallee, 124
Can. CC. 288 (1959).
1960]
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of Appeal held that the accused was a compellable
witness. The Court held that the fact that Barnes
was a defendant in criminal proceedings in which
he was not a compellable witness did not entitle
him to exemption in other proceedings. The judges,
however, were widely separated in their views as
to the propriety of such action on the part of the
authorities. Meredith, C.J.C.P., said:
"If the proceedings in the Coroner's Court
are now carried on for the purpose only of
extracting from the appellant a confession or
information such as would lead to his conviction
of the crime he is charged with, they would be
not only illegal but also inexcusable."
On the other hand Riddell, J., said:
"Much has been said as to the alleged hardship
upon Barnes in being compelled to give evi-
dence-it is, however, to be hoped that we have
not yet arrived at the point that one accused of
crime has so many and so high rights that the
people have none. The administration of our
law is not a game in which the cleverer and
more astute is to win, but a serious proceeding
by a people in earnest to discover the actual
facts for the sake of public safety, the interest of
the public generally."
The result of the abolition of the privilege
against self incrimination when used as a means
of obtaining evidence upon which to base a crimi-
nal charge has been to impair substantially the
traditional concept that a person suspected of a
crime has the right to refuse to furnish evidence
against himself through his own testimonial
utterances. It would seem, in the interest of
fairness, that in all cases a witness subject to
interrogation under oath ought at the very least
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THE WITNESS'S PRIVILEGE
As an English lawyer I think of the privilege
against self-incrimination as the privilege of a
witness to refuse to answer a question which may
incriminate him. In England, this privilege has not
caused anything like the difficulty it has in the
United States, largely perhaps because we do
not have anti-communist laws and investigations-
we have Communists, but think they are best
left alone. If a question were ever to arise in the
course of a public investigation whether a witness
were a Communist, he could not refuse to answer
on the ground of self-incrimination, since the
profession of Communism is not a crime.
Subsidiary reasons why we hardly ever hear of
the privilege against self-incrimination in England
are the following. We do not have grand juries
trying to build up evidence by inquisitorial proce-
dure. The police get their evidence by voluntary
statements, and they prefer it this way. Public
life is relatively honest, so that there is not much
corruption to investigate. We do not have the
difficulty arising from the federal structure. We do
not have the waiver rule, so that the witness can
make his claim to privilege whenever he wishes.
Finally, the judge will disallow the claim unless
there is a substantial danger of prosecution.
THE DEFENDANT'S PRIVILEGE
The title of the present symposium refers to a
principle which has been subsumed in American
legal thought under the same name as the witness's
privilege. This is the privilege of an accused person
not to be questioned in court without his offering
himself for the purpose. In my opinion, it is not
aptly called a privilege against self-incrimination,
since it is both more and less than that. On the
one hand, a defendant who does not offer himself
for questioning cannot be questioned at all-he
has a privilege not only to refrain from incrimi-
nating himself by specific answers but to avoid
being asked the questions. On the other hand, a
defendant who does offer himself for questioning
no longer has any privilege against self-incrimina-
[Vol. 51
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tion in respect of the crime with which he is
charged.
The present rule in England on the subject of
questioning the defendant to a criminal charge
remains the compromise settled by the Criminal
Evidence Act, 1898. The defendant may elect to
give evidence, and if he does so, he is sworn and
liable to cross-examination like an ordinary wit-
ness, except that he cannot generally be cross-
examined upon his previous convictions. Counsel
for the Crown may not comment upon the defend-
ant's failure to give evidence, but the judge may.
Although at first judges were chary of comment-
ing, they have come more and more to do so, and
the result is that the privilege to testify conferred
upon defendants by the Act of 1898 has consid-
erably increased the chance of convicting the
guilty.
It still occasionally happens that a judge takes
the traditional view that the defendant to a
criminal charge is entitled to maintain silence and,
accordingly, either fails to draw the jury's attention
to the fact that the accused has not given evidence
or even directs the jury not to take that fact
against the accused. A striking illustration was
the direction of Devlin, J., in the trial of Dr.
Adams in 1957. Counsel elected not to call the
defendant, and the judge directed the jury strongly
against attaching any significance to the defend-
ant's silence, maintaining that such reticence
should never be thrown into the scales on the
side of the prosecution. This certainly does not
represent the ordinary judicial view. It should
also be noticed that there was much evidence before
the court as to what had happened on the occasions
in question: it was perhaps not a case where vital
information was evidently in the possession of the
defendant which he was withholding from the
court.
The decision whether to call the accused places
a heavy burden of responsibility upon counsel for
the defence. By hypothesis, it has been held that
there is a case to answer, so that the accused is
involved in considerable suspicion. If the accused
gives evidence, his answers or demeanour may
tell heavily against him. If he keeps out of the
witness box, the judge may make this a matter of
adverse comment. Occasionally, however, the
strategy of keeping the defendant out of the
witness box is brilliantly successful, if the defend-
ing counsel can think of a plausible excuse for
doing so. At the trial of Merrett for murdering
his mother, counsel for the defence explained the
accused's silence by thanking God that "there are
people who would rather go to their death with
their lips sealed than that they should speak a
single word that would reflect on the name of a
mother." The Scottish jury, deprived of the
opportunity of hearing Merrett and not liking to
condemn the reason for it, brought in a verdict of
"not proven." The sequel was unfortunate, for
Merrett later murdered both his wife and his
mother-in-law.1
A defendant who elects to give evidence and
who then lies is technically subject to prosecution
for perjury, but it is not the ordinary practice to
prosecute for this. It seems, however, that occa-
sionally prosecutions take place..2
The submission of "no case"
A defending counsel who is in a dilemma whether
to call his client or not can sometimes save himself
a difficult decision by making a successful sub-
mission of "no case to answer" (in effect a motion
for directed verdict or dismissal). The submission is
made at the close of the prosecution's case and
must be immediately ruled upon by the judge
or magistrate, as the case may be. If the ruling is
in favour of the submission, the case will imme-
diately come to an end-if the trial is onindictment,
a formal acquittal will be taken from the jury
upon the judge's direction. Thus the accused will
be saved from making any answer.
The question to be considered upon the sub-
mission of "no case" is whether it would be proper,
on the evidence already heard, to convict the
accused if he makes no answer. In other words
the question is whether the prosecution has given
reasonable evidence of the matters in respect of
which it has the burden of proof. As the rule was
judicially expressed, no case appears unless there
is "such evidence that if the jury found in favour
of the party for whom it was offered, the court
would not upset the verdict." 3
The rule serves two principal purposes. In the
first place, it operates to control the jury, reducing
the possibility of capricious verdicts. It is true
that a capricious verdict may be upset on appeal,
but a defendant is better off to have the charge
dismissed at the trial. In the second place, the
rule gives effect to the principle that a man is
1 See T. B. Smith in [1954] CRim. L.R. 500.
2 WrmAms, THE PRooF or GUILT 67 n. (2d ed.
1958).
3 Parratt v. Blunt, 2 Cox C.C. 242 (1847).
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not compelled to answer a charge unless he is
involved in a degree of suspicion. It is an important
adjunct to the defendant's privilege of silence
during the trial; indeed, it is only where the
defendant succeeds on a submission of "no case"
that he is perfectly safe in exercising his privilege
of silence.
An illustration of the conditions in which the
submission may be successful is supplied by the
case of Atter.4 The facts given in evidence by the
prosecution were that a prostitute was found
murdered; the accused admitted he had been
with her shortly before her death, and a magazine
was found in his room which told a story of a
motiveless murder remarkably similar to the
killing of the prostitute. On a submission made by
counsel for the defence, Devlin, J., directed the
jury to return a verdict of Not Guilty. The learned
judge explained to the jury that an accused person
had a right to demand that the prosecution's case
against him should be proved before he went into
the witness box. The evidence here was mere
suspicion, and "you cannot put a multitude of
suspicions together and make proof out of it."
Formerly, the right to submit no case was
qualified in the case of joint trials. It was held that
one of two or more persons jointly tried could not
claim to be released from the proceedings for
insufficiency of evidence against him until all the
evidence for the other defendants was finished.5
But these rulings, which never had much sense in
them, have been forgotten and departed from.6
The position now is that one of co-defendants can
submit "no case" as if he were indicted alone.
There is at least one respect in which the law is
in an unsatisfactory state. If counsel for the defence
makes a submission of "no case," the theory is
that the judge is bound to rule upon it and to rule
in the defendant's favour if there is no case to an-
swer. However, there is some danger for counsel in
making the submission, because if it is overruled
the jury may misunderstand what has passed and
think that the judge is convinced of the guilt of
the accused. Thus the submission is not generally
made unless it has a good chance of success.
Another reason why the submission might not be
made in the past was that the accused might not
be represented, and although this is now unlikely
in a trial on indictment, it may happen in sum-
4 The Times, March 22, 1956; [1956] CR .L.R. 289.
5 Carpenter v. Jones (1828) M. & M. 198 n.; 173
E. R. 1130 n.; Martin, 17 Cox C.C. 36 (1889).
6 .Abbott, [1955] 2 Q.B. 497 (C.C.A.).
mary trials. One might think that a defendant
should not be the worse off if no submission is
made on his behalf, for this is a situation where
the judge should look after the interest of the
defendant and take the point himself if he thinks
that the prosecution have not produced sufficient
evidence to be answered. This opinion is, indeed,
accepted to the extent that a judge is allowed to
take the point of his own motion.7 But he is not
regarded as bound to do so, and no criticism is
made of his conduct if he allows the trial to take
its course.
This distinction has an important consequence
if the case goes up on appeal. If a submission of
"no case" has been made and wrongly rejected by
the presiding judge, the judge is regarded as
having erred in point of law, and accordingly the
defendant may appeal to the Court of Criminal
Appeal on this'ground. Now the rule with regard
to appeals on questions of law is that the appeal
must be allowed unless the case can be brought
within the proviso to section 4(1) of the Criminal
Appeal Act, 1907. The usual statement of the
effect of the proviso is that the Crown has to
show that, on a right direction, the jury must have
come to the same conclusion-a rule which in this
context means that the appeal must succeed, since
on a right direction, namely a direction to the
jury to return a verdict of Not Guilty, the jury
must have come to the opposite conclusion from
the one it did.8
Contrast the situation where there is no sub-
mission. Here the judge does not make an error
of law in allowing the trial to proceed, and an
appeal against conviction cannot adopt the same
argument as where there has been a submission.
An appeal may be taken on the ground that there
was a "miscarriage of justice," an expression
which includes cases where the verdict was un-
reasonable having regard to the evidence. How-
ever, in deciding this question the Court of Crim-
inal Appeal will look at the whole evidence,
including the evidence given by the defence in
chief and elicited from the witnesses for the defence
on cross-examination.9 It may be that a defective
case for the prosecution will thus be aided by
admissions made by the accused on cross-exami-
nation or by evidence given against him by his
co-defendant.
7 George, 1 C.A.R. 168 (1908), 25 T.L.R. 66,73 J.P. 11.
8 See the judgment of Lord Goddard, C.J., in Abbott,
supra note 6.
9 Jackson, 5 C.A.R. 22 (1910).
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At one time it was clearly settled that this
liberty to look at the evidence as a whole applied
only where there had been no submission. If there
were a submission of "no case" which was wrongly
rejected, the Court of Criminal Appeal regarded
itself as not entitled to look at evidence subse-
quently received. This was laid down in Joiner.0
In a number of subsequent cases the distinction
has been blurred, the Court saying that it is
always entitled to look at the evidence as a whole.
However, in all the cases in which this dictum
occurs, the point seems to have been obiter."
Accordingly, it is still open to the Court of Crim-
inal Appeal to follow the explicit authority of
Joiner. The decision in Joiner seems, indeed, to
be logically necessary if the law is not to be at
odds with itself. If the trial judge is under a duty
to accept a submission and stop the case, it ought
not to affect the rights of the accused if the case
is improperly allowed to continue. Nor is it only a
matter of logic, for a denial of the principle of
Joiner would put an undesirable responsibility
on counsel for the defence. Suppose that his
submission that there is no case to answer is
overruled by the trial court. He may go on with
the case by calling evidence for the defence, but,
if Joiner is wrong, will take the risk that this
further evidence may complete the prosecution's
case. The alternative is for him to take no further
part in the proceedings and to appeal against
conviction. But the risk here is that the appeal
court may uphold the decision that there was a
case to answer and may therefore affirm the con-
10 4 C.A.R. 64 (1910).
1 See H. Calvert in 1958 CRLu. L.R. 232.
viction, the defendant having in fact been con-
victed without being heard. It is unlikely that a
defending counsel would be prepared to take this
second risk, so that he is almost compelled to
proceed with the case. And the effect of this may
be that the accused is dislodged from his position
of silence.
It would be satisfactory in point of legal prin-
ciple if the decision in Joiner were re-established;
but, in addition, it may be suggested that there
should be no legal distinction between cases where
a submission is made and where it is not. The duty
of the presiding judge is to see that justice is
done, whether application is made by counsel for
the defendant or not.
Searching the body of the accused
In American legal writing, the concept of the
privilege against self-incrimination has been
applied to medical examinations of accused persons
by police surgeons, the use of stomach-pumps,
and such like. In England we should not think
of these problems as raising an issue of self-
incrimination; they relate merely to the limits on
the powers of the police in relation to detained per-
sons. Although there is little authority, it can be
said with some confidence that the use of force
against the body of a detained person for the pur-
pose of obtaining evidence is an illegal battery.
There is, however, a common-law power to search
arrested persons (the police have not tried to assert
that this extends to a search of the body, as distinct
from a search of the clothes or exterior); and ma-
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A fundamental general rule of French penal never be legally demanded.' All the more, this con-
procedure is that nobody is bound to accuse him- fession can never be extorted through torture or
self, that no one is obliged to give evidence against any kind of violence. Nor can it be obtained, ac-
himself. Although it may be necessary to denounce cording to the French jurisprudence, by surprise or
crimes committed by someone else, according to
the Penal Code, the guilty person's confession can I C.P.P., art. 62.
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by trickery or through some stratagems incom-
patible with the right to a fair trial.
However, to understand the true state of the
law, one must consider its application in several
concrete settings.
Whenever, in the course of a judicial investiga-
tion, it becomes necessary to establish or to check
on the identity of a person, the person is bound to
lend himself to whatever operations are demanded
by the investigation or checking.2 Thus, it is cer-
tain that the judicial police officer may take a
picture of the person involved and may take his
fingerprints as well.
Since 1954, French legislation has authorized,
when it is a matter of verification for a crime, a
delict, or a traffic accident, blood tests to determine
whether the act was committed "under the in-
fluence of a state of intoxication." Such tests, in
any case where they may be useful, also may be
carried out on the victim (who may be the guilty
person). Of course, the question is whether a person
has to lend himself to the checking necessary to
determine how much alcohol is in his blood. Ac-
cording to the law, "these verifications are com-
pulsory in any case of crime, delect or accident
followed by a death. ' 3 However, it does not seem
admissible that blood testing should be imposed
upon a person who refuses it absolutely. However,
a person, by his refusal, sets against himself a
presumption which may be retained among all the
other data of proof.
Several years ago, the question was raised in
France whether an interrogatory under narcotics
(narcoanalysis or narcodiagnosis) may be used in
the judicial procedure. It is quite certain that this
method cannot be used by the judicial police in
order to obtain confessions or accusations. But it
can be used by psychiatrists in carrying out a
mental examination of the accused person. The
best solution is to decide that the doctor may use
all the means of his art, and consequently have
recourse to psychoanalysis under narcotics, when
he wants to have a diagnosis either to try to cure a
sick person or to answer a question asked by the
judge concerning penal responsibility. However, in
either situation, the examination should be con-
ducted under the condition that the physician
must never, because of medical secrecy, convey to
the judge any confessions or accusations he might
2 C.P.P., art. 61.
3 CODE DES DEBITS DE BOISSONS ET DES MIESURES
CoN'=RE L'ALcooLISME, art. 1, §88.
have obtained while examining the person.4 How-
ever, this opinion is not admitted by everybody,
and the problem, which is not linked solely to the
use of narcotics but is raised by every mental
testing, has not yet received a solution which would
certain or final in the French legistation or juris-
prudence.
It was provided by the "Code d'Investigation
Criminelle" (Criminal Investigation Code), and it
has just been confirmed by the Penal Procedure
Code, that the accused person can never be a wit-
ness in his own trial, and, if he makes some state-
ments in front of his judges, he does not have to do
it under oath. Otherwise, he might have to choose
between perjuring himself or accusing himself. The
French law saves him from the necessity of this
choice by excusing him from the oath and, in so
doing, sets aside the possibility of an accused per-
son getting a penal sentence for false testimony.
The French law does punish the person who,
possessing proof of the innocence of a person prose-
cuted for a crime or delict, does not produce spon-
taneously his testimony to the justice. However,
the person responsible for a prosecution, as well as
his collaborators and accomplices, is not subject
to this obligation of testifying in behalf of the
innocent person. To provide otherwise would re-
quire the person responsible for a false prosecution
to accuse himself of a crime.5
By the same decree, a similar exemption is
granted to the parents and relatives-up to the
fourth degree of relationship-of accused persons,
their collaborators and accomplices. In addition,
the decrees which mention the obligation of re-
porting crimes and attempted crimes do not punish
any refusal to report them when it is the doing of
the perpetrator's parents or relatives.6 And, in the
same way, the accused person's close relatives do
not speak under oath when they have to appear in
the trial.7
On the other hand, witnesses who testify under
oath cannot be excused for any personal reasons
from fulfilling the obligations imposed upon them
by the oath. Thus, the witness will bring upon him-
self punishment for false testimony in case he
violates his oath, even if he lies only to protect him-
4 Cf., H. Donnedieu de Vabres, 29 RE uE INTER-
NATIONALE DE POLICE CRIMINELLE 25 (1949) and
Vouin, Rec. Dalloz, Chronique, 101 (1949).
SC.P.P., art. 63.
C.P.P., art. 62.
C.P.P., arts. 335 and 448.
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self from possible prosecutions. 8 Should this witness
be allowed to refuse his testimony under the excuse
that he should not be put under the obligation of
accusing himself? That remedy, in the French
opinon, would be worse than the evil.
According to the Criminal Investigation Code of
1808, a full account of the charge had to be made
by the "minist~re Public" at the beginning of the
trial in the Assize Court and the president was
allowed to interrogate the accused person only after
each witness's testimony and on the ground of this
testimony. However, a different practice actually
was established. In fact, the account of the charge
was never made, and the president would in-
terrogate the accused, in front of the jury, about
the facts with which he was being charged.9
Actually, this interrogatory was a cause of abuses.
Most certainly, the accused person had the possi-
bilty of not answering, but in this case, the presi-
dent alone was speaking, and too often he had the
appearance of a prosecutor. The jurisprudence
slowly reacted, deciding that a sentence was in-
valid when it had been pronouned by an Assize
Court the president of which, in the process of the
trial, had before the proper time spoken out con-
cerning his feelings with respect to the guilt of the
accused.0
This solution is quite justified, because the
president of the French Assize Court and his two
assessors, since 1941, participate in the jury's de-
liberation on the guilt of the accused person. So it
has been maintained by the Penal Procedure Code
of 1958, according to which the president interro-
gates the accused and gets his statements, that,
under penalty of invalidity, the president "has
the duty not to show his opinion on guilt.""1 One
may object that it would have been better to omit
completely the accused person interrogatory by the
8 Cass. Crim., Rec. Dalloz 1918.1.36 (1914).
9 Cf., Vouin, RlvuE DE SciENcE CRnmqELLE 43
(1955).
10 Cass. crim., Bull. Crim. No. 476 (1956).
11 C.P.P., art. 328.
president and reinforce the account of the charge
by the "ministre public."
Under the authority of the Code of 1808, the
judicial procedure for the preliminary investiga-
tion, the purpose of which was to determine
whether sufficient evidence existed to justify a
trial of the accused person, was consonant with the
old inquisitorial type of procedure, that is, it was a
written, secret, and "non contradictoire" pro-
cedure. This system was greatly modified by the
law of December 8, 1897. Under this law, the ac-
cused person, if he so desires, may be helped during
the investigation period by a barrister who is in-
vited to each interrogatory and who is allowed to
study beforehand the dossier of the procedure.
Moreover, the barrister is permitted to communi-
cate freely, at any time, with his client.
This procedure is unanimously viewed, in
France, as an elementary guarantee of the rights
of the defense. Consequently, it has been retained
without discussion by the Code of 1958.12 However,
one may ask himself very seriously whether the
principle of the "instruction contradictoire" is
really justified. In fact, to the extent that the
accused person participates in the preliminary ex-
amination, he may, later on, feel embarrassed to
question its results before the jurisdiction of judg-
ment. During the preparation of the new Code, it
had been offered to make "contradictory" the
expert's report carried out in the process of the
preliminary investigation.13 However, this pro-
vision was not incorporated because the barristers
very dearly stated that they would rather not have
the defense participate in the expert's report in
order to be able later on to criticize freely the ex-
pert's conclusions. The objection seems right. But,
if it is accurate, it should be put forward as well
against the very principle of the "instruction con-
tradictoire."
'- C.P.P., arts. 114 and 118.
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In the German law of procedure-not only civil
and criminal, but also administrative, labour,
social, etc.-the rule "nemo tenetur se ipsum accu-
sare" has been generally accepted for well over one
century. It is based on the ethical concept that the
procedural interest in the exploration of the truth
must stand back behind the higher valued interest
of the individual to be protected from any coercion
to self-incrimination. It is the purpose of this report
to show how this principle is legally ruled in the
field of criminal procedure.
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE DEFENDANT
Privilege of silence
This subject matter is covered by section 136 of
the German Code of Criminal Procedure (herein-
after called CCP). This section deals only with the
interrogation of the defendant by the judge. As the
expression of a general principle, though, it is held
to apply also to his interrogation by the public
prosecutor and the police.' It reads:
(i) At the beginning of the first interrogation the
defendant shall be informed about the nature of
the charge. He shall be asked if he wants to reply
to the charge.
(ii) The interrogation shall give the defendant
an opportunity to remove the grounds for sus-
picion prevailing against him and to put forward
the facts which speak in his favor.
(iii) During the first interrogation of the suspect
an inquiry shall also be made into his personal
status.
(a) Privilege of silence ad ren
Section 136(i), CCP, points out quite clearly
that the defendant-who incidentally cannot be
heard as a witness under German law, and hence
cannot make a sworn statement in a case against
himself-is under no obligation to answer the
1 See EBERHARD SciMDT, LEHRKOMMNTAR zuR
STRAFPROZEBORiDNUNG (1957), Vorbemerkung 6 vor
§133, Teil II (Instructional Commentary of Criminal
Procedure, part II, preliminary note no. 6, §133,
1957).
charge, i.e., to make a statement ad rem. Rather,
he is entitled to refuse to answer the charge or keep
silent from the beginning.
It is a contested question whether the defendant
who does not take advantage of his privilege of
silence is under procedural law obligated to tell
the truth. The predominant and correct opinion
of the law teachers2 answers this question in the
negative. However, the discussion about the de-
fendant's duty to tell the truth appears to be use-
less anyway, because the CCP provides for no
means of forcing him into telling the truth or
changing an untrue statement.
And at any time he is allowed to revoke both his
preparedness and his refusal to make a statement,
as well as a former statement, especially a con-
fession.
(b) Privilege of silence ad personam
It appears to be uncontested that under pro-
cedural law the defendant is not obligated to give
particulars, let alone correct particulars, per-
taining to his personal status. The former
Reichsgericht, 3 however, and some legal theorists4
take the view that such obligation can be deduced
from the substantive law, namely section 360(8)
of the German Criminal Code (hereinafter called
CC). This provision penalizes him who before a
competent authority or a competent official makes
an incorrect declaration or refuses a declaration
with regard to his name, his status, his calling, his
business, his residence or his nationality. The ques-
tion whether this provision is applicable to the
defendant who has violated it in the course of a
procedure against himself, should-contrary to the
Reichsgericht-be answered in the negative.
This follows from the generally accepted legal
2 See EBERHARD SCsiDXT, op. cit. supra note 1, §136
n.11-13.
3 72 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Straf-
sachen 30 (decisions of the Reichsgericht in Criminal
Matters).
4 See KLEiUIMNECcT-MiiLrR, KOr.NTAP ZUR
STRAFPRozEssoRDNuNo, 4 Auflage, Anmerkung 2a zu




concept of the "collision of interests" which says
that a less valuable interest must stand back when
it comes into conflict with a higher-valued interest.
Beyond dispute, the privilege of silence ad rem as
laid down in section 136(i), CCP, is higher in value
than the average person's duty to give true par-
ticulars ad personam, established in section 360(8),
CC, which penalizes the offender only with a fine
up to 150 Deutsche Marks or with detention up to
six weeks. Now in practice the enforcement of a
true statement ad personam will in many cases
violate and even defeat the higher-valued privilege
of silence ad rem, because true particulars often
throw light upon the identity of the offender and
hence incriminate him ad rem and contrary to the
statute. The predominant opinion 5 is therefore that
the defendant has no duty-neither under pro-
cedural nor under substantive law-to answer or
to answer correctly in regard to his particulars, and
is not punishable under section 360(8), CC, if he
refuses a declaration ad personam or gives false
particulars.
(c) Consequences of refusal to answer or of false state-
inents.
As mentioned, the CCP does not attach detri-
mental consequences to the silence or deliberate
falsehood ad rem or ad personam of the defendant.
This is not to say, however, that such demeanor
should be always irrelevant in the sphere of sub-
stantive law. Adverse consequences of such nature
are for example the following:
(i) Stubborn or insolent denials of the defendant
can influence sentence, as is justly held by the
Federal Supreme Court, especially in several de-
cisions rendered in 1951.6 In view of the fact that
the defendant is not obligated under the law to
make a confession, and any pressure used in this
connection is prohibited, the Federal Supreme
Court rules it to be inadmissible to assess a more
lenient punishment only on account of a confession,
and a more severe punishment only on account of a
denial. Yet it justly takes the view that the court
in considering the stubborn denial of a defendant is
free to draw its conclusions as to the degree of his
personal guilt, especially as to his lack of re-
6 See EBERHARD ScHmuDT, op. cit. supra note 1, §136
n.9, and HENKEL, STRAFVERTAHRENSRECHT (Law of
Criminal Procedure) 223-24.
6 1. Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in
Strasfsachen 103, 105 (Decisions of the Federal Supreme
Court in Criminal Matters), and MoNAxrsscHaRt FuR
DSuTscnEs REcHT (German Law Monthly) 440 (1951).
pentance and dangerous criminal character. For
this reason, the Federal Court goes on to say, the
judge may deny mitigating circumstances or may
make no allowance for the period of custody under-
gone awaiting trial or may impose a stiffer
sentence.
(ii) The Federal Supreme Court further holds
that the silence or denial of a defendant may con-
stitute or increase the danger- of collusion and so
may be relevant to the grant of a warrant of arrest.
(iii) Finally, the willingly false statement of the
accused may constitute another criminal offense.$
For instance if he in his defense declares the sworn
incriminating statement of a witness to be a lie,
this may incur punishment under section 164, CC
(false accusation), or section 185 and following of
the Criminal Code (defamation, slander, etc.).
Other aspects of the privilege
In the absence of a clear legal ruling criminal
courts and law teachers have stretched the pro-
tection of the suspect from self-incrimination be-
yond his privilege of silence, and have developed
the principle that the suspect is under no obligation
to make an active contribution 9 to his conviction.
In application of this principle the Reichsgericht"c
does not think it the suspect's duty to furnish a
specimen of writing for the purpose of contriving a
comparison of writings within the meaning of sec-
tion 93, CCP, and it is generally accepted" that
the suspect is not under the obligation, laid down
generally in section 94, CCP, to surrender objects
which might be of importance as evidence or are
subject to confiscation.
While not being under an obligation to make an
active contribution to his conviction, as was said
above, yet the suspect is under an obligation to
maintain a passive attitude in regard to measures
which are instrumental in his conviction, i.e., he
must tolerate them. His consent is not necessary.
This applies in particular to his bodily examination
as provided in section 81a, CCP, and to the taking
of a blood-test (with the restriction that detri-
7 MONATSScm= sih DEUTscHEs REcnr 532
(1952).
8 See KLEINKNEcHT-.%iLLER, op. cit. supra note 4,
§136 n.3.
9See BELING, DIE BEWEIsvERBoTE AIs GRENZEN
DER WAHaHEITSERFORSOHUNG LU STRAFPROZESS (The
Evidential Prohibitions in Criminal Proceedings as
Limits to the Search for Truth) 11 (1903).
"015 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in
Strafsachen 320.21 See BELiG, op. cit. supra note 9, and EBERHARD
SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 1, §94 n.17.
19601
WALTER CLEMENS
ments to his health shall not ensue), and further to
the taking of pictures and finger-prints, measure-
ments and other modes of action under section
81c, CCP, as well as the seizure of letters and tele-
grams written by him or addressed to him under
section 99, CCP, the search of his dwelling under
section 102, CCP, etc.
THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WITNESS
The privilege of silence
Section 55, CCP, provides:
(i) Every witness can refuse information as to all
questions the answer to which might incur prose-
cution for himself....
(ii) The witness shall be advised on his privilege
to decline to answer questions.Y
The question whether this provision applies
also to the interrogation of the witness by the
district attorney or the police is generally answered
in the affirmative as far as paragraph (i) is con-
cerned. It is, however, generally answered in the
negative respecting paragraph (ii),13 which appears
unfortunate but cannot be helped de lege lata.
Section 55(i) establishes-other than section 136(i)
for the defendant-no general right of the witness
to decline to answer, but only the limited right to
refuse information on any facts the description of
which might incur punishment against himself.
Section 55(i) is the outcome of the already men-
tioned basic principle that nobody is obligated to
incriminate himself. The provision serves to pro-
tect the witness only, not the defendant, so that-
according to the opinion of the Federal Supreme
Court, 4 which, however, is not uncontested-a
review on law does not lie on the defendant's behalf
if the court has failed to advise the witness on his
privilege of silence according to section 55(ii) CCP.
The declaration of the witness that he would
take advantage of his privilege of silence is just as
revocable as his declaration that he would make a
statement.', If it is only at the trial that a witness
12 An important supplementing provision to §55 is
§56, CCP. It says that the facts on which the witness
grounds his privilege must be supported by evidence
to the satisfaction of the court, and that the solemn
declaration of the witness on oath is sufficient for that
purpose.
13 As to details, see EBERHARDT SCMUDT, op. Cit.
supra note 1, §52 n.15.
'4 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in
Strafsachen 39.
1-"63 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in
Strafsachen 302 and EBERHIARD SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra
note 1, §52 prelim. n.9.
who prior to it had been heard by the district
attorney or the police refuses to give evidence, then'
the court is, under section 252, CCP, prohibited
from using his former statements. This applies
also to the evidence of a witness who, contrary to
section 55(ii), CCP, was not advised properly."
Section 55(i) does not permit the witness to con-
ceal from the court a fact endangering himself if
he has not taken advantage of his privilege of
silence. Rather is he in such case bound-this is,
in contrast to the defendant-to tell the whole
truth; and he will, under the CC, incur punish-
ment by giving false evidence.
Other aspects of the privilege
The witness can refuse his consent to a bodily
examination and the taking of blood for the same
reasons as he can under section 55(i), CCP, refuse
his testimony. This is provided for in section 81c(i),
CCP. He is also not under the obligation to sur-
render objectswhichmighthave evidential value or
are subject to confiscation (section 95(ii), CCP).
However, the CCP does not go as far as to spare
the witness such search or confiscation as might
result in his criminal prosecution. Such action he is
bound to tolerate, just like the suspect.
THsE PRIVILEGE OF THE EXPERT
Under section 76(i), CCP, the expert is entitled
to refuse to give his opinion for the same reasons
as entitle a witness to refuse to make a statement,
especially under section 55(i), CCP. So, all that in
this connection was said about the witness will
apply here correspondingly. A farther-reaching
protection of the expert is not provided for by the
CCP.
PRIVILEGES OF OTHER PERSONS
On behalf of persons other than the suspect, the
witness, and the expert, a protection, within the
scope of criminal proceedings, from self-discrimina-
tion is out of the question and therefore not pro-
vided for by the CCP. It is true that this statute
does grant some other privileges of silence. These
rights, however, have no bearing on the concept
of the privilege against self-incrimination, because
their objective is not to afford the privileged per-
sons protection from self-incrimination, but pro-
tection from the incrimination of others, especially
near relations, from conflicts of conscience, etc.




It is for this reason that the near relations of the
suspect have under section 52, CCP, in principle
been conceded the privilege of silence. Again, under
section 55(i), CCP the witness is entitled to refuse
to answer if, otherwise, a near relation would be
jeopardized with criminal prosecution. And under
section 53 certain persons who are under the pledge
of secrecy, e.g., clergymen, defense counsel, law-
yers, doctors, etc., have also been granted the
privilege of silence, unless they have been released
from their duty to professional discretion.
SLMARY
In the light of the foregoing observations, the
following summary of the German law can be
made:
The CCP affords the defendant, the witness,
and the expert a very extensive protection from
self-incrimination. This protection is founded on a
basic principle which has been generally acknowl-
edged for more than a century and has in the Fed-
eral Republic become an integral part of the
general sense of justice. Therefore it must be main-
tained unrestrictedly, all the more so since nobody,
as far as is known, has demanded to narrow or re-
peal the relevant provisions after the breakdown of
the Nazi-regime.
Within the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Law of Criminal Procedure is exhaustively covered
in the CCP, that is on a federal basis. As a result
the German Lllnder, according to the provisions of
the Basic Law, have no right to enact law pertain-
ing to this matter. Thus, in the absence of a com-
petitive sphere of legislative jurisdiction between
the Bund (Federation) and the Liinder, no prob-
lems of dual sovereignty can arise in this area in
the Federal Republic of Germany.
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In his classic outline of the history and policy
of the privilege against self-incrimination, Wigmore
categorically states that the origin of the privilege
was purely local (17th century-England) and
that "in the other legal systems of the world it
had no original place."' It is not so much in order
to disprove that statement, nor to suggest that
the Anglo-American concept of the'privilege
against self-incrimination may have been in-
fluenced by ancient Middle Eastern institutions,
but rather in order to show how deeply this con-
cept is entrenched in Israeli legal consciousness,
that a short account is given of its origins in the
law of ancient Israel.
The rule that no man may incriminate himself
was first distinctly enunciated by Rava, who lived
in exile in Babylon in the 4th century A.D., 2 in
the following terms: "a man is nearest to himself,
and no man calls himself a wrongdoer."3 Later
18 WIGmoRE, EvrmoNc §2251 at 304 (3d ed. 1940).
2At exactly the same time, Roman law provided
specifically for judicial examination of accused persons
under torture: ThEODOsiAN CODE BOOK IX Title 35
(De Quaestionibus) at 250 (Pharr Trans.).
3Talmud Sanhedrin 9, 1.
jurists have separated the two component parts
of this rule from each other and have laid down the
second part of the rule as a general prohibition of
self-incrimination; 4 but the two parts of the rule
have to be read together for a proper understand-
ing of its origin.
Both near relatives and wrongdoers are in-
competent witnesses. The incompetency of near
relatives was based on an interpretation of the
scripture5 to the effect that a man may not be put
to death either for the sins of his parents or of his
children or because of, that is, on the testimony of,
his parents or children. 6 The incompetency of
wrongdoers was derived from the scripture, "put
not thine hand with the wicked to be an un-
righteous witness,"'7 which was read to mean that
the wicked are bound to be unrighteous witnesses
and therefore are incompetent.8 It appears that
incompetency to testify was not .generally re-
4 See, e.g., Rashi (Shlomo Yitzhaki) in his Commen-
tary to Talmud Yebamot 25, 2.
5 Deuteronomy 24, 16.
6Talmud Sanhedrin 27, 2.
7 Exodus 23, 1.8Talmud Sanhedrin 25, 1; Baba Kama 72, 2.
HAIM H. COHN
garded as a disqualification which one should do
one's best to remedy, but rather as a welcome
cause to evade the onerous duty of testifying.
Not only was the punishment for false testimony
very severe (namely the same punishment to
which the accused had been liable, had he been
convicted9), but if the accused was convicted of
a capital offence, "the hands of the witnesses shall
be first upon him to put him to death."'0 In addi-
tion, there may have prevailed then, as there pre-
vails today, very good reasons for a potential
witness not to get implicated in judicial proceed-
ings. There cannot, at any rate, be any doubt that
potential witnesses tried to disqualify themselves
from testifying by asserting that they had com-
mitted this or the other offence or that they were
leading dissolute lives, so as to bring themselves
within the category of the "wicked" who had to
be presumed to be "unrighteous" witnesses. It
was in order to cure this mischief that Rava laid
down his rule: as far as the incompetency of near
relatives was concerned, none is nearer to a man
than he himself, and if his near relatives are in-
competent to testify against (or for) him, afortiori
must he be incompetent to testify against (or for)
himself; but as far as the incompetency of wrong-
doers is concerned, no man may be heard to assert
that he is a wrongdoer so as to disqualify himself as
a witness.
The incompetency to testify in one's own favour
dates from a period earlier by at least two cen-
turies than Rava's time. There is, for instance,
a Mishnaic" text to the effect that the presump-
tion that a woman is violated by the enemy while
held as a prisoner cannot be rebutted by the solemn
oath of her husband that "her hand did not move
out of my hand from the day the enemy entered
Jerusalem until he left," because nobody is a wit-
ness in his own cause.Y (It was, on the other hand,
always recognized that a man must be heard in
his own defence, albeit not as a witness; and the
Mishnaic law was that even after sentence had
been pronounced, proceedings had to be reopened
up to five times if the accused wished to argue
something in his favour, provided it was an argu-
ment of substance3) There was, thus, nothing
revolutionary in Rava's ruling that a man is not
competent to disqualify himself as a witness by
9 Deuteronomy, 19, 19.
10 Deuteronomy, 17, 7.
" The Mishna is the earliest part of the Talmud and
was finally completed about 200 A.D.
1Talmud Ketubot, 27, 2.
1Talmud Sanhedrin 42, 2.
his own testimony: although self-incriminating,
this testimony was in his own favour, because its
purpose was to be released from the duty of testify-
ing in another cause. In a different context, the
same Rava even reduced the ratio of the prohibi-
tion of bribery to the formula, "no man will con-
vict himself"-meaning that, having received a
bribe, the judge might identify himself with the
donor and thus become a judge in his own cause.14
Nor was there anything surprising in the subse-
quent evolution of Rava's rule into a general pro-
hibition of self-incrimination. Indeed, the prior
existence of a rule against self-incrimination, al-
though not yet expressly formulated, may be
deduced from several Mishnaic texts. Thus, a
biblical instance of questioning a person accused
of crime and obtaining his confession ("And
Joshua said unto Achan: make confession and
tell me now what thou hast done; hide it not from
me. And Achan answered Joshua and said: indeed
I have sinned.., and thus and thus have I done" 1 )
was interpreted in the Mishna as if the confession
had been asked for and made only after trial and
conviction and not before, and then only for the
purpose of expiating the sin before God so as not
to be revisited again after death. 6 Later jurists
dismissed this and similar biblical stories simply
as exceptions to the general rule,'17 although not a
single instance of the application of any such rule
occurs in the Bible.18
Or, where witnesses to a deed testified that at
the time they had witnessed the deed they were
incompetent for reason of their sinfulness, their
evidence as to their witnessing the deed was held
admissible and that as to their incompetency was
held inadmissible. 9 Or, where a man came forward
14 Talmud Shabbat 119, 1; Ketubot 105, 2.
Is Joshua 7, 19-20.
16 Talmun Sanhedrin 43, 2.
The confession of sin in repentance before God is,
of course, always encouraged and at certain times (the
day of atonement) even prescribed. But these confes-
sions have no legal significance and are not admissible
in evidence against the confessor or at all; it is a sin
even to remind a man who has confessed before God of
the misdeeds he had confessed to: Maimonides, Teshuva,
7, 8. (For a similar rule, cf. Canons 1755, 1757, Corpus
Juris Canonici.)
1' Maimonides, Sanhedrin, 18, 6.
"8 It is worthy of note that Lilburn, defending him-
self against the claim by the judges that he was, al-
though an accused, under obligation to be examined,
relied on the law of God for his refusal to answer (3
HoweAn's STATE TRIALS 1315); but he gave no par-
ticular text in the scriptures as authority for his proposi-
tion, except Christ's trial by Pilate, and there stood
at once corrected by the judges (See 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENcE §2250 n.103.)
19Talmud Ketubot 18, 2.
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and said that he had killed a woman's husband,
that woman could not, on the strength of such evi-
dence, be allowed to remarry.
20
The question thus arose whether a man's state-
ment may be divided so that only the self-in-
criminating part would be inadmissible, whereas
the neutral part would be admissible in evidence.
In the case of the self-confessed murderer of the
woman's husband, for instance, one school held
that the confession would be admissible as evi-
dence of the husband's death, but not of his
murder by the confessor; another school held that
the confession was indivisible and inadmissible
for any purpose. 7 There finally emerged a rule
that the neutral part of a confession is admissible
only for the purpose of corroborating other inde-
pendent evidence: thus, where the issue requiring
proof is the death of a man, the evidence of a wit-
ness to the death may be corroborated by that part
of the confession of the killer which testifies to the
death having occurred; but the killing can never be
proved by the confession of the killer even" where
corroborated by the evidence of one independent
witness, because at least two witnesses are required,
and the confessor is not a witness against himself Y
At about the time of the Mishna another rule
had been laid down to the effect that the admission
by a party to a suit that a debt was owed by him
was tantamount to the evidence of a hundred wit-
nesses.23 This was well established law when Rava
first enunciated his rule; and the fact that the con-
cept of the prohibition of self-incrimination had
existed and been recognized before Rava formu-
lated the rule with regard to the competency of
witnesses is also apparent from the way in which
the conflicts between valid admissions and invalid
confessions had been solved. Thus, where a man
admitted to have raped or seduced a woman, or to
have stolen a chattel, he could not on the strength
of such admission be adjudged to pay a fine or
otherwise be punished but would be held liable to
pay damages to the injured party.24 Or, where a
man said to two others, I have stolen a sum of
money from either the one or the other of you, but
do not know from whom, he was held to be liable
to both; another school held that where a man had
admitted to have stolen money, and several persons
came forward, each claiming that the money had
been stolen from him, the stolen money was to be
20 Talmud Yebamot 25, 1.
21 Talmud Yebamot 25, 2.
2 Hameiri on Sanhedrin 1, 1 (13th century).2 7Talmud Gittin 40, 2; Kiddushin 65, 20 et aliunde.24Talmud Ketubot 41, 1.
deposited in court, and the thief would not have to
pay more than once.25
In later times, the rule that the confession to a
criminal act would serve as a civil cause of action,
but would not be admitted as evidence in criminal
proceedings, was applied to confessions of arson, 26
embezzlement,27 the taking of usurious interest,7
and, by analogy, of adultery-the confessing wife
losing her claim to maintenance and other mone-
tary benefits, but not her status as a married
woman, and incurring no liability to be divorced or
punished on the strength of her, confession only.A
An early authority poses the question whether
the injunction of the scripture, "Ye shall have one
manner of law,"30 should not be read to prohibit
any distinction between civil and criminal law with
regard to admissions and confessions; the question
is answered in the negative, because the scripture
itself says in civil causes, He shall pay, but in
criminal causes, He shall die."'
The reasons underlying the rule against self-
incrimination were at various periods differently
expounded. The earliest version appears to be that
as the scripture expressly commands, "at the
mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he
that is worthy of death be put to death, but at the
mouth of one witness he shall not be put to death"2
-no one may be condemned otherwise than on the
evidence of witnesses, as distinguished from the
evidence of himself.-" Maimonides adds a reason of
his own, holding that a court may not inflict
punishment on a man only because of his having
coinfessed to a crime: "maybe his mind is disturbed
in this matter, or maybe he is one of those melan-
choly and depressed persons who look forward to
dying and are apt to run a sword through their
bodies or throw themselves from a roof, and maybe
such a person comes forward and confesses to a
.crime which he did not commit, so as to be put to
death.'m Another reason given was based on the
words of the prophet that all souls are the Lord
God's,35 hence no admission by which a man may
forfeit his life can be of any effect, his life being not
25 Talmud Baba Metzia 37, 1.2
6 Rashba (Shlomo ben Aderet), 13th century.
27 Mordehai (Mordehai ben Hillel Ashkenazi), 13th
century.
28Ritba (Yomtov ben Avraham of Sevilla), 14th
century.
2 Maimonides, Ishut, 24, 18, (12th century).20 Leviticus 24, 22.
31 Tossefta Shevuot 3, 7 (completed about 600 A.D.)
m Deuteronomy 17, 6.
3 Tossefta Sanhedrin 11, 3.
u Maimonides, Sanhedrin 18, 6.
3- Ezekiel 18, 4.
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his own but God's to dispose of, whereas his prop-
erty is his own, and he may dispose thereof in any
way he likes, including by the admission of debts.
36
Still another theory propounded was that if con-
fessions were accorded any probative value in
criminal proceedings, courts might be inclined to
overvalue them, as King David did,3 and thus be
guilty of a dereliction of their own fact-finding
duty.u Later jurists pointed out the real difference
between civil admissions and criminal confessions
to be that by an admission, an obligation was cre-
ated which had only to be enforced by the court;
whereas the conviction of a criminal offence was
not in the nature of the enforcement by the court
of an obligation voluntarily undertaken by a party
but of a creation by the court of the party's
liability.39
36 Radbaz (David ben Zimra), 16th century.
37 2 Samuel 1, 16: "And David said unto him, Thy
blood be upon thy head; for thy mouth hath testified
against thee, saying I have slain the Lord's anointed."
Joseph Ibn Migash (11th century).
2 Levush Mordehai (Mordehai Epstein), 19th
century.
With the emancipation of the Jewish communi-
ties and the loss of domestic criminal jurisdiction,
the rule prohibiting all self-incrimination has be-
come obsolete. In the new State of Israel, the
English common law privilege has replaced the
ancient Jewish law prohibition: self-incrimination
is no longer regarded as unlawful per se, but is now
left to the free choice of the individual concerned.
But any suggestion that even the privilege should
now be abolished and a person be made compellable
to give evidence incriminating himself, would-
whatever the weight and substance of the reasons
prompting such reform-find no countenance in
Israel. Although no part of a formal constitution,
the principle is, in the words of Cardozo, "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental"; and any
attempt to further restrict its scope and applica-
tion would be denounced as incompatible with
democracy and the rule of law.
apan*
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND'
It is not easy to realize the true picture of the
Japanese system designed for protecting human
rights against illegal or unfair exercise of investi-
gating authority without having some preliminary
knowledge about the historical background of the
Japanese legal system. This is particularly true for
an accurate understanding of the concept of the
privilege against self-incrimination in Japan.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the encourage-
ment and advice of Professors Fred E. Inbau and
Claude R. Sowle in preparing this article for publica-
tion. The author wants to express his appreciation to
Miss Ruth E. McKee of the American Embassy,
Tokyo, who has been kind enough to refine the English
and give him valuable advice on linguistic matters.
',See also Abe, Self-Incrimination-Japan and the
United States, 46 J. CRmt. L., C. & P.S. 613 (1956).
Therefore, a brief account of the democratizing
process of the Japanese system is given.
Historical Sketch up to 1889
From the 8th century down to the 1860's crim-
inal justice in Japan was profoundly influenced by
Chinese legal tradition. Ancient Chinese laws had
been adopted and modified by feudal precedents
and ordinances. The thought and philosophy basic
to the administration of criminal justice were the
result of a mixture of traditional Japanese morals
under feudalism and the Japanese interpretation of
Confucian ethics.
Since the 1860's the Japanese system of criminal
justice has experienced two revolutionary changes.
The first one occurred in the 1870's, following the
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Meiji Restoration, under the influence of ,Euro-
pean legal culture, and the second one started in
1946 following the termination of World War II,
under the influence of Anglo-American legal tra-
dition.
In 1868 the Tokugawa Shogunate's Government
collapsed and was succeeded by the more enlight-
ened government of the Emperor Meiji. However,
it took time for the new government to sweep away
all the feudalistic remnants. For example, it was
not until 1879 that legalized torture was entirely
abolished. Beating and "Stone Holding" were
common techniques employed to extort confessions
from prisoners.2 In the "Stone Holding" torture
the prisoner was forced to sit upon a corrugated
wooden seat, holding heavy flat stones of about 100
pounds each in his lap. Astonishingly enough, the
criminal statutes of the 1870's retained the pro-
visions for torture devices. Moreover, Article 318
of the Revised Criminal Code of 1873 provided
that "the accused shall be found guilty by the con-
viction of the court based upon his confession."
This provision, which declared the principle of
"no conviction without confession," helped to en-
throne confession as "the queen of evidence."
In 1876, being urged by Professor Boissonade,
who had been invited from France by the Japanese
Government to codify and modernize the legal
systems of Japan, the government changed the
wording of Article 318 of the Revised Criminal
Code to provide that "the accused shall be found
guilty by evidence."3 This was the first step to-
ward reformation. In 1879 the age-old torture
system was statutorily abolished. In 1880 the
Criminal Procedure Law drafted by Professor
Boissonade after the model of French law was
enacted. Thus, under the influence of the European
culture of the 19th century, the new Japan
gradually paved its way to the modernization of
its legal system.
Development under the Old Japanese Constitution
Even prior to World War II Japan had a consti-
tutional law which was to some extent based upon
'he principles of the rule of law and representative
government. The Imperial Constitution of 1889
provided for the separation of powers and con-
2 For the details of the torture techniques employed
in the feudal ages and prewar days in Japan see Abe,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 613-619,'
3 For the event which moved Prof. Boissonade to-
ward such action see Abe, op. cit. supra note 1 at 616
n.14.
tained a limited bill of rights. Under the Imperial
Constitution criminal justice was administered
under the law as enacted by the national legis-
lature. However, Japan was far from being a
modern democratic country in that she was
reigned over and ruled by the Emperor, who was
regarded as an incarnate deity and the ultimate
source of sovereign power. The principal char-
acteristic of this old regime was its compromise
between the ideal of modern constitutionalism
and the traditional principle of government by the
Emperor. Under such constitutional monarchy
the principle of the rule of law could not command
its full implementation. The civil rights of the
subjects were sometimes restricted by the ad-
ministrative superiority of the Emperor's Govern-
ment. It should be noted also that leading poli-
ticians and jurists in those days could not realize
fully the significance of the r6le of the bill of rights.
Under the Imperial Constitution of 1889, the
Penal Code of 1907 and the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure of 1890 were enacted. The latter was re-
placed by the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1922.
Judging from the wording of the new statutes,
there seemed to be no substantial difference be-
tween the modernized criminal justice of Japan
and that of a European country. Criminal justice
based on these new laws was strongly influenced
by German legal theories and considerably colored
by the liberalism of the 19th century. For instance,
the new system adopted the accusatorial system
and the principle of trial on evidence. Thus, al-
though the blueprint of the machinery of criminal
justice under the new system was not too unsatis-
factory, the practice went along in a direction
divergent from that originally expected. The prac-
tice of coercing confession became rather common
among the police; prisoners were kept "incom-
municado" quite often; and the preliminary exam-
ination, which was kept secret from the public,
became a sort of "Star Chamber" affair.
Rejorm under the new Constitution of 1947
The governmental system of Japan underwent a
fundamental change when the "Constitution of
Japan" came into force in 1947. This occurred dur-
ing the occupation of the Allied Powers following
the termination of World War II. Under the new
Constitution, with the adoption of a revised par-
liamentary system, the establishment of the prin-
ciple of a parliamentary cabinet and the securing of
the complete independence of the judiciary, a
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democratic government has been established. The
Emperor has descended from the position of in-
carnate god and has lost his political power. He is
now nothing but "the symbol of the State and the
unity of the people." Under the new regime the
principle of the rule of law in its pure and perfect
form has been embodied in the existing legal system
through the constitutional guarantee of funda-
mental human rights and the creation of a system
of judicial review over administrative and legis-
lative action. With the establishment of the revised
governmental system under this new Constitution,
Japan has achieved the appearance of a modern
democratic state at least from the legal aspect. It
was against this historical background that the
present code, the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1948, 4 was enacted. The functions of the reformed
machinery of criminal justice in Japan can be ap-
preciated only in the new light of the postwar
regime.
As was mentioned before, the former Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1922 was based in its en-
tirety on European (particularly German) law,
whereas the present Code of Criminal Procedure of
1948, which was enacted under the new Constitu-
tion of 1947, has largely adopted Anglo-American
devices to protect human rights. The new Code is
still based, however, on the Continental tradition
of law in its general scheme. Thus, it may be said
that the present system of criminal justice in
Japan is a mixture of Continental (especially
German) and Anglo-American traditions of law.
PARTICULAR PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE PRIV-
ILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
IN JAPAN
Is the Privilege Worthy of Retention?
Is the privilege against self-incrimination worthy
of retention? Despite the strong antagonism of
Japanese criminal investigators toward the privi-
lege, most Japanese lawyers seem to agree that
the privilege is worthy of retention with or without
qualifications. Article 38 of the Japanese Constitu-
tion proudly declares that "No person shall be
compelled to testify against himself .... '. Under
the present criminal procedure, a suspect is en-
titled to be notified of the privilege against self-
incrimination before being interrogated.5 Thus, in
starting interrogation most Japanese investi-
gators reluctantly murmur the following proto-
type phrase: "You don't have to answer, if you
don't want to." It is contended that such a me-
chanical warning does not help very much. The
suspects may even take it as an ironical challenge.
But there is no doubt that such a warning helps
to remind the investigators themselves of their
obligations to respect the privilege against self-
incrimination.
In an article published a few years ago the
author analyzed the concept of the privilege
against self-incrimination in Japan from various
angles and pointed out the high disciplinary
effects of this constitutional device.6 The author
has no intention of reiterating all the discussions
presented in the previous article. In this chapter,
therefore, only highlights of the current issues in
Japan will be given.
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the
Right to Cross-Examination
It is submitted that Japan was so hurried in
adopting the concept of privilege against self-in-
crimination that she overlooked the possible un-
balance between the privilege and the whole
structure of traditional criminal justice.
Under Anglo-American law it has been well
settled that once the accused has taken the witness
stand he is assumed to have waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and may be cross-exam-
ined by the prosecution with respect to what he
stated in the direct examination. Strangely enough,
Japanese law did not adopt this rule when it im-
ported the concept of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Under Japanese law a defendant is
incompetent as a witness. This means that he
cannot be sworn as a witness even though he may
be willing. He may of course testify without taking
an oath if he does so voluntarily; but since he is not
sworn, he may conceal the truth or make a false
statement without risking perjury.7 Thus, he en-
joys an absolute privilege even to refuse to answer
the questions propounded by the prosecution or the
judge with regard to the ambiguous points con-
tained in his statement; the court is not allowed to
consider the mere fact that the accused failed to
answer by invoking his privilege. Such particular
status of law strengthens the privilege against self-
4 THE CODE OF CRIINAL PROCEDURE (Law No.
131, July 10, 1948; enforced on January 1, 1949).
6TBE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, art. 198,
par. 2: "In the case of questioning mentioned in the
preceding paragraph [i.e., *questioning of a suspect
by a public prosecutor, public prosecutor's assistant
officer or judicial police officer], the suspect shall, in
advance, be notified that he is not required to make a
statement against his will".
6 See Abe, op. cit. supra note 1.
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incrimination into a privilege of silence or even a
privilege of false statement. Unquestionably this is
impairing the spirit of even-handed justice.
The Privilege Not to Identify Oneself
In interpreting the concept of the privilege
against self-incrimination, most Japanese judges
have been taking the position that the privilege
should include the right to withhold one's own
name and any other information which might
identify oneself. Should the name of the accused be
regarded as something which tends to incriminate
him? Under Anglo-American law this question will
generally be answered in the negative, except in
particular cases where falsifying a name constitutes
the essential part of a crime; in general, a name,
although it is something of primary importance to
investigators or the triers, is only a remote fact
which rarely tends to incriminate a person. Under
Japanese law, however, most judges and progres-
sive scholars are prone to interpret this privilege as
being in the accused's extreme favor. They adopt
the concept in its logical pureness, eliminating or
disregarding all the qualifications which have
been imposed upon the concept in its long histori-
cal development under the Anglo-American system.
There have been many cases in which accused
persons have not disclosed their names throughout
the proceedings; most judges have taken such prac-
tice as a matter of course.
The first challenge to this practice was made in
1951 by the Sapporo High Court in the case of a
communist appellant who, in"filing the appeal,
used the signature "Unknown X," which was not
recognized as an ordinary signature required by
the rules of criminal procedure. The court dis-
missed the appeal, holding that in filing an appeal
the appellant was not entitled to use such a mean-
ingless signature as a means of invoking the privi-
lege against self-incrimination.' The reasoning was
substantially based on the theory that because he
actively asked the appellate court for a judicial
7 Cf., THE PENAL CODE or JAPAN, art. 169: "When a
witness, who has been sworn in accordance with law,
gives false testimony, imprisonment at forced labor for
not less than three months nor more than 10 years
shall be imposed." In this connection it may surprise
Anglo-American lawyers to learn that in civil actions,
while the parties can be sworn, should they give false
testimony it would not constitute a crime of perjury
since the provision concerning that crime applies only
to witnesses, not to parties. Cf., THE JAXa AEsE CODE
oF CivrL PRocEDuRE, arts. 336 et seq., esp. arts. 338
and 339.
8 Vol. 4, No. 5 High Courts Crim. Rep. 512 (Sapporo
High Court 1951).
remedy, he, as the moving party, should reveal his
name. However, the opinion of the court was criti-
cized as conservative even by the judiciary on the
theory that it required the appellant to make an
unnecessary feudalistic courtesy in exercising his
own right to appeal.
The second challenge was made in 1952 by the
same high court in a case where the counsel filed
an appeal in the names of three communist appel-
lants "Unknowns X, Y and Z". The court dis-
missed the appeal as against procedure, holding in
substance (a) that the privilege against self-in-
crimination might be invoked only at the stage of
the main proceedings and with respect to the facts
concerning crimes; (b) that the privilege did not
authorize the appellants to conceal their names at
the stage of preparing the main proceedings; (c)
that the notification of appointment of the counsel
made in the names of "Unknowns X, Y and Z" was
illegal; (d) and that the appeal filed by the counsel
illegally appointed was null-and void
The theory proposed by the high court decision
was confirmed by a recent Supreme Court de-
cision. In 1957 the Supreme Court dismissed an
appeal taken by communist defendants from a de-
cision of the Tokyo High Court affirming a de-
cision of the Chiba District Court which held
that the notification of appointment of a counsel
undersigned with defendants' jail numbers was
null and void. In that case the court held that
one's own name should not be regarded as a fact
tending to incriminate oneself concerning which
the accused had the constitutional privilege of'
non-disclosure."
However, the view advocated by these judicial
precedents has not been very popular among the
majority of scholars and judges, although it has
been enthusiastically accepted by practical-minded
lawyers and investigators. It appears that in Japan
the function of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is far-reaching, because most judges are (a)
still giving the phrase "against himself" in Article
38 of the Constitution as broad an interpretation as
"against his will on any ground" and (b) allowing
the witness himself to judge the probability of self-
incrimination."
9 Vol. 5, No. 10 High Courts Crim. Rep. 1653
(Sapporo High Court 1952).
10 Vol. 11, No. 2 Sup. Ct. Crim. Rep. 804 (Grand
Bench 1957).




The Statutory Duty of Disclosure in the Quasi-
Public Relationship
Does the privilege against self-incrimination ex-
cuse the statutory duty of disclosure in the quasi-
public relationship? This problem appears to have
been of vital importance under American law.
12 It
is becoming important also in Japan, where there
are"a great number of administrative statutes
which comprise specific provisions imposing upon
citizens the duty to file reports, to keep records, to
disclose records for official inspection, and to
answer questions asked by administrative officials
with respect to matters of quasi-public impor-
tance." It is obvious that the draftsmen of these
statutes were aware of the problem regarding the
relationship between the privilege of non-disclosure
and the statutory duty of disclosure, because some
of those provisions requiring administrative reports
or records contain a precautionary proviso that
"the prescribed authority of questioning and in-
spection should not be interpreted as granted for
criminal investigation.' 4 However, because as a
matter of fact in most cases an administrative in-
vestigation may reveal the facts tending to incrim-
inate the subject person, this proviso has only ab-
stract meaning.
Recently the problem of the constitutionality of
the provisions requiring incriminating disclosure
has been discussed in several cases. In 1948, a
licensed custodian of narcotics, was prosecuted
under the Narcotics Control Law for his failure to
record an unlawful delivery of narcotics. The
Niigata District Court and the Tokyo High Court
held that the defendant was not guilty because,
owing to the privilege against self-incrimination,
he should not be compelled to record the unlawful
delivery of narcotics. The prosecution appealed
from the decision of the high court. In 1954 the
Supreme Court reversed the decision of high
court, holding that, despite the privilege against
self-incrimination, the defendant had the duty of
recording the illegal delivery of narcotics because
he had consented to be controlled by the Narcotics
Control Law when he applied for a position as a
12 See, for example, Note, Quasi-Public Records and
Setf-Incrimination, 47 COLum. L. REv. 838 (1947);
Strasheim, Agreements and Obligation to Waive the
Right Against Self-Incrimination, 32 NEB. L. REv.
577 (1953).
1E.g., Tna INcomE TAx LAw, arts. 63, 64, 70;
Tna CORPORATION LAw, arts. 48, 49; THE NARcoTics
CONTROL LAw, arts. 37-50, 53, 72; THE GAS SUPPLY
ENTERPlUsE LAw, arts. 21-29, 46, 47, 58, 59.
14 See, e.g., THE INHERITANcE TAX LAw, art. 60,
par. 4.
licensed narcotics custodian. 5 This decision ap-
pears to have relied on the so-called "waiver by
consent" theory.
Two years later the Supreme Court again held
that the provision of the Narcotics Control Law
requiring the recording of illegally handled nar-
cotics was constitutional despite Article 38, Par. 1,
of the Constitution.6 In this case the Court relied
upon the reasoning that the law imposing the duty
of recording was constitutional because such con-
trol was required from the standpoint of public
health. The theoretical basis of this reasoning ap-
pears to be (a) the consideration of the quasi-public
relationship between the custodian of narcotics
and the state and (b) the so-called the "generic
class of acts" theory as proposed by Wigmore.Y
Some other precedents also were based substan-
tially upon the "generic class of acts" theory. For
example, in a case where the issue was the consti-
tutionality of the Alien Registration Law requiring
the alien who had illegally entered Japan to apply
for registration, the Supreme Court held that the
law imposing the duty did not infringe upon the
privilege against self-incrimination because the
law imposed only the duty to apply for registration,
not the duty to disclose incriminating facts."'
There are also a few high court decisions which
are based substantially on the same theory and
support the constitutionality of tax law provisions
which required incidentally self-incriminating facts.
For example, in a tax law violation case the
Nagoya High Court held that the provision of the
Corporation Tax Law, which punished the maker
of a falsified income report, did not infringe upon
the privilege against self-incrimination although
the income had been illegally obtained by black
marketing, because the provision required the re-
port on the income itself, not the report on the
illegal source of the income.19
Recently the dilemma between the privilege
against self-incrimination and the quasi-official
, 1" Vol. 8, No. 7 Sup. Ct. Crim. Rep. 1151 (2d Petty
Bench 1954).
16Vol. 10, No. 7 Sup. Ct. Crim. Rep. 1173 (Grand
Bench 1956).
17 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE §2259(c) (3d ed. 1940).
"8 Vol. 10, No. 12 Sup. Ct. Crim. Rep. (Grand Bench
1956). Also see Vol. 12, No. 1 Sup. Ct. Crim. Rep. 1
(1st Petty Bench 1958) holding that to request under
the threat of punishment the presentation of an alien
registration certificate does not violate art. 38, par. 1
of the Constitution, even if the request were made by
the public officer for the purpose of criminal investiga-
tion of the name and residence of the alien.
19 Vol. 4, No. 7 High Courts Crim. Rep. 704 (Nagoya
High Court 1951); see also Vol. 5, No. 2 High Courts
Crim. Rep. 160 (Tokyo High Court 1952).
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duty of disclosure has been highlighted by , series
of inferior court decisions concerning the constitu-
tionality of a sort of "hit and run" provision in
Article 67, Par. 2, of the Road Traffic Control
Law Enforcement Ordinance.20
The Road Traffic Control Law, Article 24, Par.
1, provides: "In case where death or injury of a
person or destruction of property has been caused
by the traffic of a vehicle, horse or tram-car, the
driver, crew or other worker thereof shall aid the
victim and take other necessary measures in ac-
cordance with the provisions of ordinance." In
amplifying this provision of law the Road Traffic
Control Law Enforcement Ordinance, Article 67,
Par. 2, further provides: "In the event that the
driver of the vehicle, horse or tram-car mentioned
in the preceding paragraph (or the crew or other
workers thereof in case of an accident of the driver)
has taken the measures prescribed by the preceding
paragraph and does not find a police officer on the
scene of accident, he shall immediately inform a
police officer of the police station exercising juris-
diction over the place of the accident about the
substance of the accident and the measures taken
according to the same paragraph and shall receive
directions from the officer as to whether he may
continue to drive or leave the scene of accident."
The first challenge to the constitutionality of Arti-
cle 67, Par. 2, of the Ordinance was made in 1949
by the Kobe District Court, Amagasaki Branch. In
a "hit and run" case, where the defendant left an
injured pedestrian helpless, the court held that
Article 67, Par. 2, of the Ordinance was unconsti-
tutional, because it required the defendant to dis-
close the details of the accident, thereby possibly
leading to his incrimination for negligent homi-
cide.21 In the same year, however, an opposing view
was expressed by the Kobe District Courtn and
the Kagoshima Summary Court.n The former
ruled that the provisions were constitutional on the
ground that they were administrative provisions
aimed at the maintenance of public welfare and
had nothing directly to do with Article 38 of the
20 THE LAW FOR = ENFoRCEMENT or Tm ROAD
Tarrlc CONTROL LAW (Cabinet Ordinance No. 261
of 1953 with the latest amendment by Cabinet Ordi-
nance No. 254 of 1958).
21 Decision of the Kobe District Court, Amagasaki
Branch, May 28, 1959, 189 HANREI Jmo (Law Reports
Times) 6 (1959).
2 Decision of the Kobe District Court, June 22,
1959, 195 HANREI Jmo (Law Reports Times) 8 (1959).
2 Decision of the Kagoshima Summary Court,
July 7, 1959, 195 HANREI Jmo (Law Reports Times) 9
(1959).
Constitution. The latter supported the constitu-
tionality of the provisions on the theory that the
necessity of the public welfare might restrain the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
Both of these appear to depend upon the theory
that even a constitutional right may be restrained
by the necessity of public welfare, and the former
has a slight implication of the "generic class of
acts" theory.
One month later the holdings for constitution-
ality were rebutted by another decision rendered
by the Akita District Court, Yuzawa Branch.24
This court emphasized the short linkage between
the required disclosure and the possible prosecu-
tion which may result from the data disclosed and
declared the unconstitutionality of Article 67,
Par. 2, because of its substantial compulsion to
self-incriminating statement.
Recently, however, an eclectic view for consti-
tutionality was propounded by the Utsunomiya
District Court. In a "hit and run" case where the
defendant, after giving emergency aid to two per-
sons he injured, drove away without reporting to
the police, the court held that Article 67, Par. 2 was
constitutional insofar as it could be interpreted to
require the defendant to inform the police of such
facts as do not directly tend to incriminate him.25
Under this theory it is enough for a driver hitting
a person to inform the police of the fact of the acci-
dent without disclosing his name by personally re-
porting or anonymously telephoning or sending a
message to the police. It should be noted also that
in the course of reasoning the court made the fol-
lowing criticism of the traditional justification of
"hit and run" statutes: It is improper to restrict
the privilege of non-disclosure in the name of public
welfare; if so, one might totally deny the privilege
in criminal procedure because of the public nature
of the criminal procedure which is designed to
maintain welfare and security of the community.
Thus, until the Supreme Court says its last word
24Decision of the Akita District Court, Yuzawa
Branch, Aug. 19, 1959, 198 HANEI JIHo (Law Reports
Times) 20 (1959).
21 Decision of the Utsunomiya District Court, Oct.
17, 1959 (not yet published). Also see Decision of the
Tokyo District Court (the 17th Division), Dec. 14,
1959, which expressed another eclectic view for the
constitutionality of article 67, par. 2, on the theory
that under the provisions a person may be punished
for his failure to make a required report, but that
such a report is inadmissible as evidence against him
if the incriminating disclosure is made under the threat
of punishment. However, this qualification does not
satisfactorily function as a guaranty in cases where the
disclosure is used as a clue.
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on this complicated problem, the ado over the con-
stitutionality of "hit and run" provisions will con-
tinue.2
6
MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMERICAN AND
JAPANESE CONCEPTS OF THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIHINATION
Immunity Statutes and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination
In the United States "Immunity Statutes" seem
to have been one of the most effective weapons of
investigating authorities in their fight against or-
ganized crime that is guarded with the privilege
against self-incrimination.?
In Japan there have been no remarkable move-
ments toward enactment of such immunity
statutes. Since the enactment of the Federal Com-
pulsory Testimony Act of 1954, Japanese lawyers
have been aware of the practical significance of the
device. However, it is generally with academic
interest that most Japanese lawyers regard it. The
reason why the Japanese draftsmen are rather
apathetic to this seemingly attractive device to con-
trol unbridled use of the privilege against self-
26 Thus far no Supreme Court decision on this issue
has been handed down. However, it should be noted
that recently the Osaka High Court (Decision of Osaka
High Court, Dec. 22, 1959) reversed the Kobe District
Court decision, note 21 supra, and held the provisions
to be constitutional on the theory that the provision
should be interpreted to require the report which helps
to identify the accident (e.g., date, place, and an outline
of the accident and the name of the victim) but not to
require the report concerning the circumstances which
tend to show negligence on the part of a driver. The
reasoning of the court complies by and large with the
view of Assistant Professor Fujiki of Tokyo Uni-
versity as expressed in his recent article Dorokotsu
Torishimari Ho Shiko Rei 67-Jo 2-Ko to Mokuhiken
(Art. 67, Par. 2 of the Road Traffic Control Law En-
forcement Ordinance and the Right to Non-Disclosure)
Vol. 12, No. 8 KaisATsU GAu RONsHu (Police Science
Review) 12 (1959). Judge Urabe expressed an opposing
view to Mr. Fujiki's in his article Jiko o okoshita Jidosha
Untenshn no "Jiko nq Naiyo" Hokoku Gimu to Mokuhiken
(Duty of Reporting the "Substance of an Accident" by
the Driver who Caused the Accident and the Right to
Non-Disclosure, 20 HANuxi HYORON (Law Reports
Review 3 (1959). He maintained that the broad word-
ing ("Substance of the Accident") does not permit the
limited interpretation as suggested by Mr. Fujiki and
suggested a legislative specification of the wording. It
should be noted that a legislative change is contem-
plated in accordance with the view of Judge Urabe.
ee also Tamiya, Jidosha Jiko no Hokoku Gimu to
Mokuhiken (Dty of Reporting an Auto Accident and
the Right to Non-Disclosure), 189 JURIsT 24 (1959), a
useful comment on the recent decisions on this subject
with specific reference to American cases on "hit and
run" statutes.
27 See, e.g., Comment, Immunity from Self-Incrimina-
tion Under the Federal Compulsory Testimony Act,
46 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 679 (1956).
incrimination is psychological rather than logical.
The wisdom on which "immunity statutes" are
based is very simple. A child who has broken a
window in conspiracy with his friends may say to
the angry mother: "I will tell you who did it if you
don't punish me, Mommy." And if the mother is
very anxious to know, she may give immunity to
her child and say: "O.K. Johnny, I won't punish
you. Then tell me honestly who did it." This is the
psychology of the immunity system. Perhaps
Japanese government lawyers are too austere to
relinquish their prosecuting authority in such a
psychological game of give and take.
Denial of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
to Public Officials
Although Japanese law expects public officials to
cooperate with criminal investigations,w it does
not go so far as to require public officers to waive
their privilege against self-incrimination. Ethically,
doubt has been expressed as to the propriety of
permitting a witness to refuse to give testimony
tending to subject him to subsequent prosecution,
especially where a public officer as a witness in-
vokes the privilege to cloak alleged malfeasance in
office. Legally, however, public officials fully
enjoy the privilege against self-incrimination, even
when they are prosecuted for crimes closely related
to their official duties. Strangely enough, there have
been no movements toward legislation designed to
restrict the privilege of government officials. Since
there is no particular psychological factor hamper-
ing such legislation the reason for this legislative
hesitance may be attributed to the fact that
Japanese lawyers have been unfamiliar with this
type of legislation. Very few lawyers in Japan have
been aware of the fact that in some states of the
United States there are statutes and precedents
which, under the threat of dismissal, compel gov-
ernment officials to waive their immunity with re-
gard to matters within the scope of their duties.2
28 Cf., THE CODE OF CRMNAL PROCEDURE, art.
239, par. 2, which provides: "When a government or
public official in exercise of his function believes that
an offense has been committed, he must lodge an ac-
cusation."
2 See, e.g., Note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 987 (1951); Note,
Claim of Immunity from Self-Incrimination by Public
Officers, 64 U.S.L. REv. 561 (1930); NEW Yoas CoN-
sTrrooN, art. 1, §6 (as amended and effective Jan. 1,
1939); Canteline v. McClellan, 282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E.2d
972 (1940); Christal v. Police Comm'n 33 Cal. App. 2d
564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939); Goldway v. Board of Higher
Educ., 37 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1942); Drury v. Hurley, 339
Ill. App. 33, 88 N.E.2d 728 (1949); LA REv. STAT.,
tit.3 3, §2426 (1950).
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However, it is foreseen that the day will come when
the draftsmen of Japanese law will be fully aware
of the possibility of this type of legislation and start
to move toward it.
Non-Testimonial Disclosures and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination °
Should the privilege against self-incrimination
excuse a person from producing a writing in his
possession? If so, to what extent? Anglo-American
law has answered the question in the affirmative,
although it has been making continuous efforts to
limit the scope of the privilege, which has been
improperly far-reaching. In the course of these
efforts, official documents and corporation records
have been removed from the protection of the
privilege on the basis of the "personal nature
doctrine" or "public or quasi-public record doc-
trine."
However, most Japanese lawyers will doubt the
rationale of the Anglo-American rule that a person
shall be protected from the compulsory production
of writing just as a person shall be protected from
the coercive taking of evidential utterance from
his lips. Once an incriminating piece of information
has been embodied voluntarily in documentary
material, the compulsory production of the ma-
terial will be far less painful to the person who has
given the information than the compulsory taking
of the information from his lips.
Under Japanese law, the scope of compulsory
search and seizure is interpreted to cover "any
articles" whatsoever which the court believes
should be used as evidence or liable to confisca-
tion." The phrase "any articles" has been inter-
preted to comprise any sort of real or documentary
evidence which will be relevant and admissible in a
court. Japanese law has no rule excluding docu-
mentary evidence simply because of its self-incrim-
inating nature. The requirement of a warrant or an
order of the court is a guaranty against a possible
misuse of the system of compulsory production of
articles.
In the United States the problem of compulsory
taking of physical evidence, such as blood tests,
alcoholic intoxication tests, etc., has been much dis-
cussed also under the topic of self-incrimination."
30 The points made in this and the following chapter
appeared in substantially the same form in Abe, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 627-29.
3 Cf., THE CoDE or CzRnuNA PROCEDuRE, arts. 99,
102 and 218.
"2 It should be noted here that Professor Inbau con-
cluded from his historical survey of the development of
However, most Japanese lawyers will doubt the
reason why this type of disclosure should be cov-
ered by the privilege against self-incrimination.
Experience shows that the admission of such type
of physical evidence has the most pleasing effect of
killing the need for confession and of stimulating
scientific investigation. Again a more flexible ap-
proach under the Japanese law will be noted.
REEXAMINATION OF DUALISM OF STATE AND
FEDERAL JURISDICTIONs AFFECTING THE
SCOPE OF THE PRIVILEGE
In the eyes of Japanese lawyers the rule of
dualism of state and federal jurisdictions as affect-
ing the privilege against self-incrimination appears
to be somewhat strange. The American federal rule
of "dualism" established by the Murdock 4 case and
elaborated by the FeldmaiP5 case "cuts into the
very substance of the Fifth Amendment"3 6 and is
"subversive of the spirit and letter of the Bill of
Rights."E
- Let us ask, "What is the rationale of the dualism
in the privilege against self-incrimination?" Wig-
more's view was that (a) the privilege is not sub-
stantially curtailed by the dualism because the
danger of prosecution is remote and (b) the diffi-
culty of ascertaining what is criminal in another
jurisdiction should make a different rule imprac-
tical.3s Are these two corner stones of the dualism
still sound today? The world has become much
narrower than in the days of Wigmore. Not only
the world but also the universe is becoming
the privilege that it was originally designed to prohibit
"the practice of extracting incriminating statements
from accused persons." INBAU, SELF-INcRIBINATION:
WA CAN AN AccusED PERSON BE CoMPELLED TO Do?
5 (1950).
"Under the Japanese law the problem of the ad-
missibility of physical evidence is answered expressly
in the affirmative by the provisions concerning "evi-
dence by inspection (kensho)" and "expert evidence
(kantei)." See ThE JAPANEsE CODE OF CRIMINAL
PROtEDURE, arts. 128 el seq., especially art.'218, par. 2,
providing for the taking of finger prints, foot prints,
or photographs of the accused, and art. 167 providing
for the possibility of confining the accused in a certain
place if necessary for an expert examination, e.g. for
an insanity test. To prevent misuse, all these means of
compulsory taking of physical evidence are subject tojudicial control in the form of warrants or orders of the
court. In the Japanese courts physical evidence taken
by these means is evaluated as the most reliable and
scientific basis of fact finding. The witnesses lie often,
but the things and circumstances do not.
14United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
3" Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
3" Id. at 498 (dissenting opinion of Black, J.).
3 7 McAllister, 3., in In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263,
284, 291 N.W. 652, 661 (1940).
"Wi GoRE, EVIDENCE §2258 (3d ed. 1940).
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smaller. The technique of communication has made
remarkable progress. Testimony in a court may be
communicated to every corner of the country in a
few hours through a network of mass-media, such
as radio, television and newspapers. The police
network also will be quick enough to detect new
pieces of evidence against the witness using his tes-
tim.ny in a court as a clue. On this new basis a
state witness might be prosecuted in a federal court
and vice versa. Under such circumstances, it is not
practical to say that a state and a federal jurisdic-
tion are foreign to each other, as much the same
relation as between "China" or "Peru" and the
United States ; nor is it proper for a federal court
to pretend to be "blind" to the laws and facts of a
state jurisdiction and vice versa. The development
of legal publications and the possibility of using
legal experts are enabling state courts to know the
law of a federal jurisdiction and vice versa. Now
-Id., §2258.
that the two cornerstones of the dualism have lost
their significance, is there any other reason for in-
sisting on dualism?
It was noteworthy that the DiCarlo4" and the
Adams4' cases proceeded a few steps toward a
realistic solution of this problem, but did not reach
it.
A fallacy of dualism appears most clearly in the
application of immunity statutes. It is extremely
unreasonable that a witness should be compelled to
testify under an immunity statute in one jurisdic-
tion while risking prosecution in another jurisdic-
tion. This means trapping a person with a seem-
ingly lawful device. A practical and realistic step
toward the elimination of this fallacy is urgently
desired.
40 United States v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D.
Ohio 1952).
41 Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
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No precise doctrine regarding self-incrimination
is to be found in Norwegian or Scandinavian law
as is the case in Anglo-Saxon law, but certain of the
principles which are derived from the Anglo-
Saxon doctrine are applicable in the Scandinavian
countries. Thus a person who is charged or ac-
cused has no duty to give a statement (apart from
his name, position and address) to the police or to
the court, and he can make a false statement with-
out being liable to punishment.' He cannot confirm
his statement by oath.
A witness, as a rule, has a duty to give a state-
ment in court and to confirm his statement by
oath. If the questioning implies that the witness is
suspected of an offense, he can demand to be
charged, and then he has no duty to answer. Nor
has he a duty to answer if his answer will expose
him to the danger of losing the respect of his
fellow citizens.2
I PENAL CODE or 1902, §167.
2 CRaINAL PROCEDURE AcT OF 1887 (hereinafter
called CPA), §177. See also PENAL CODE, §167.
When the question arises as to what extent the
accused in other ways has a duty to cooperate with
the solution of the case in view, the legal position
in Norway (and in the other Scandinavian coun-
tries) is very dubious in many respects. Thus the
extent to which an accused person may be sub-
jected to various forms of frisking, tests, and so on,
is somewhat vague.
According to the Norwegian Criminal Procedure
Act it is permitted to search a person who on
reasonable grounds is suspected of having com-
mitted an act for which the maximum statutory
penalty is higher than a fine, if there is reason to
believe that the search will lead to the discovery of
evidence against him.3
Although the Criminal Procedure Act has no
clear provisions on the point, it is assumed that
the right to search also includes an examination of
the body of the accused. The aim for such an exam-
ination may be to find scratches, bites, punctures




body of the accused. 4 It is characteristic of this
examination that it only has to do with the eternal
condition of the body and that it does not exceed
the process of observation.
The legal position is more doubtful when it
comes to the question of the admissibility of per-
forming an operation or the like on the accused, in
order to obtain evidence against him. Examples of
such actions are gynecological examinations,
stomach pumping, blood tests, etc. As regards
blood tests, there is a clear authority in the motor-
ing laws permitting the testing of a person whom
there is good reason to suspect of having driven a
motor vehicle in an intoxicated condition. 5 (A
person who has, when driving, more than 0.5
promille (per thousand) concentration of alcohol in
the blood is considered as intoxicated' and is
usually sentenced to at least 21 days imprison-
ment.) The general opinion in Norway is that the
provision in respect of blood tests in the motoring
laws is practical and important to the clearing up
of the case, and that it does not constitute any un-
reasonable invasion of the rights of the person
charged.
Corresponding provisions in respect of blood
tests are found in Danish and Swedish law.
It is not clear to what extent the police have the
right to take a blood test from persons other than
those who are suspected of having driven a motor
vehicle in an intoxicated condition. In practice,
however, a blood test is sometimes taken in such a
case, and there has been, as far as I know, no occa-
sion when the person involved has opposed the test.
At any rate, the courts have not been faced with
the problem of the legality of such an examination
undertaken against the wishes of the person tested.
Furthermore, it is doubtful how far an accused
person may be subjected to similar forms of cor-
poral examination or operation.
One might perhaps say that it is the current Nor-
wegian law that operations or the like on an accused
person, in order to obtain evidence against him,
can only be undertaken against his will when au-
thority for the procedure exists in the written law.
In this connection it can be mentioned that some
years ago the Supreme Court decided that a woman
suspected of having undergone an illegal abortion
4 1t is generally held that CPA, §221, authorizes
such an examination of the body of the accused.
5 THE LAW oF MOTOR VEmCLES oF 1926, §17.
6 Ibid.
could not be compelled to submit to gynecological
examination.7
Physical examination of the accused can involve
a fourth type of evidence, the so-called evidence of
identity (fingerprints, photographs, confronting
with witnesses, handwriting tests, etc.). In this
field, too, we have no clear legal provisions in
Norway. However, the question whether an ac-
cused person is bound to give fingerprints did
come before the Supreme Court in 1929 and 1935,
and in both cases the court decided that the accused
was so bound." The court reached its decisions
mainly by analogous reasoning, recalling the pro-
vision in the criminal law that an accused person is
bound to give his name, position and address.9
With regard to the other forms of evidence of
identity, there is no legal precedent, but it may
surely be assumed that the accused is also bound
to permit his photograph to be taken, submit to
confrontation, etc.10 In practice accused persons do
not generally protest against partaking of such
examinations.
Finally another type of investigation will be
dealt with: The use of the lie-detector, narco-
analysis and similar chemical or technical media
whose purpose is to solve the question of guilt. In
Norway these measures have not hitherto been em-
ployed during investigations. Moreover, it is
probably not permissible to employ them, even if
the accused person consents to the measure.
In recent years the question of the permissi-
bility of such measures has been discussed at some
length by professional men in the Scandinavian
countries," and it seems to be the general view that
the measures should be entirely excluded from the
system of criminal law, at any rate until they
have reached a higher degree of reliability- than is
the case to day.
It must be added that narcoanalysis has been
undertaken in a number of cases in Denmark and
in Sweden in connection with psychiatric observa-
tion of the accused, but the purpose has not been
to bring to light whether the accused has com-
mitted the crirqe he was suspected of but rather to
gain information concerning his state of mind. The
7 Norsk Retstidende (Nor. Law Rep.) 204 (1936).
8 Norsk Retstidende (Nor. Law Rep.) 221 (1929)
and 1088 (1935).
9 PENAL CODE, §333.
10See BRATHoLm, PAAmGRPELSE OG VARETEKTS-
FENGSEL (Arrest and Detention Before Trial) 258(Oslo 1957).




accused has, of course, in all cases consented to the
narcoanalysis.
It may be mentioned that in Norway there is no
exclusionary rule, and there is reason to believe
that evidence obtained by illegal means in most
cases will be admitted.
In conclusion one may say that although in
Norway-as in the other Scandinavian lands-
there is no doctrine corresponding to that in
Anglo-Saxon law on self-incrimination, there is in
these countries a limit to What the accused may be
subjected to. But at present it is far from clear in
many types of cases where the line should be
drawn. The absence of a fixed doctrine has brought
it about that the accused-and in some cases
counsel as well-are not aware of the possible
rights of a charged person in this respect, and this
again leads to the fact that problems seldom arise
in practice. Most persons, when charged, consent
to the inquiry desired by the police, because they
believe that it is their duty to cooperate. Many,
too, are anxious to avoid the aggravation of sus-
picion that would be caused by refusal to submit to
investigation. As contact with Anglo-Saxon law
improves, there is good reason to believe that more
and more persons will become aware of the prob-
lem of self-incrimination, and thus more attention
will be devoted to it in theory and in legislation.
In that connection it can be mentioned that a
committee was appointed a couple of years ago
with the responsibility of drafting a new criminal
procedure act for Norway. 12
1 The chairman of the committee is Professor Johs.
Andenaes, Director of the Institute of Criminology and
Criminal Law, Oslo.
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